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“THE JUDGE SAID, ‘SON, WHAT IS 
YOUR ALIBI . . . ?’” A SURVEY OF 




  In this Article, the Author provides a general overview of the Alaska law of 
criminal discovery. The Article first discusses the prosecutor’s discovery 
obligation and then discusses the major aspects of Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules 
of Criminal Procedure and how Alaska courts have interpreted these 
provisions. The final part of the Article discusses a variety of issues 
 
Copyright  2009 by James Fayette. 
 †  See LEFTY FRIZZELL, THE LONG BLACK VEIL (Cedarwood 1959). This 
Article’s title is from the lyrics to the bluegrass ballad, The Long Black Veil. The 
song’s narrator is accused of murder, but he refuses to reveal his alibi, even as 
his execution nears: 
The judge said son what is your alibi 
If you were somewhere else, then you won’t have to die. 
I spoke not a word, though it meant my life 
For I’d been in the arms of my best friend’s wife. 
As we will see, under Alaska law, the protagonist could have steadfastly refused 
to answer the judge’s question for reasons unrelated to chivalrous discretion—
up until the moment he called his paramour as a defense witness at trial. See 
Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974). However, timely pre-trial notice of 
his intent to assert an alibi defense would have been required. See ALASKA R. 
CRIM. P. 16(c)(5). 
 * The author is a prosecutor with the State of Alaska, Department of Law 
in Anchorage. He has served as the supervisor of the special prosecutions 
section of the Office of Special Prosecutions & Appeals, as an assistant district 
attorney at the Anchorage District Attorney’s Office, and in the U.S. Army Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps at Fort Richardson, Alaska. He previously published 
a survey of Alaska self-defense law. James Fayette, “If You Knew Him Like I Did, 
You’d Have Shot Him, Too...” A Survey of Alaska’s Law of Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA L. 
REV. 171 (2006). 
  This Article is a revision of a paper originally prepared for presentation 
at the May 2008 Alaska Bar Association Convention. Because the author is a 
state prosecutor, this article reflects a prosecutorial focus. However, the author 
hopes this survey will be useful to the criminal defense bar and the bench as 
well. 
  The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone. This paper is not a 
policy statement of the State of Alaska, Department of Law. 
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commonly encountered by criminal law practitioners, including discovery of 
juror information, the timing of discovery disclosures, and information the 
prosecution is not required to disclose. 
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Modern criminal law practitioners cannot approach the subject of 
pre-trial discovery without acknowledging a debt to the late Supreme 
Court Associate Justice William Brennan. In an influential 1963 lecture, 
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Justice Brennan argued that defense discovery should be expanded to 
help turn the criminal trial from a sporting contest into a search for the 
truth.1 
Justice Brennan’s call for expanded pre-trial discovery has 
prevailed in Alaska criminal practice, at least for the defense bar. In 
Alaska state courts, criminal defendants have far broader rights of pre-
trial discovery than do those in federal courts. However, in day-to-day 
Alaska state criminal practice, discovery disputes are still common.2 
Disputes over discovery scope, timing, and sufficiency are daily 
topics in Alaska state court pre-trial hearings. This survey of Alaska’s 
criminal discovery court rules and case law is intended as an aid to our 
criminal bench and bar. As with my previously-published survey of 
Alaska self-defense law, this survey is a practitioner’s guide. Aside from 
a few practical suggestions, there is no normative argument presented 
here. My intent is to provide criminal law practitioners and the criminal 
bench with a fairly comprehensive survey of court rule and case law 
authority that defines the scope of both prosecutors’ and defense 
attorneys’ criminal discovery obligations. 
This survey is organized as a section-by-section survey of Alaska’s 
primary discovery court rules followed by a topical survey. Part I briefly 
surveys the sources of the prosecutor’s discovery obligations. Parts II, 
III, and IV examine Rule 16 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
These sections collect and annotate significant reported and unreported3 
appellate opinions that have interpreted each subsection. Part V is a 
topical survey of commonly encountered issues that appear in practice. 
 
 1. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or 
Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990). Brennan argued 
that expanded pre-trial discovery would dispel the notion that a criminal trial 
was a game, and that review of the state’s case would be of greatest value to 
indigent defendants who often could not afford their own investigation.  
Brennan also argued that expanded disclosure of the defendant’s case to the 
prosecution might cause more cases to be resolved short of trial.  Id. at 285–88. 
 2. In August 2008, the Alaska Criminal Justice Working Group concluded 
that discovery delay constituted the greatest impediment to efficient criminal 
case processing and also contributed to overcrowding in pretrial jail facilities. 
Memorandum from Larry Cohn, Executive Director, Alaska Judicial Council to 
Christine Johnson, Alaska Court System (Aug. 19, 2008) (on file with author). But 
see Improving Criminal Caseflow Management in the Alaska Superior Court in 
Anchorage; Technical Assistance Report, Table 4 (Jan. 30, 2009) (finding that 
discovery caused delay in 8.7% of felony trial cases, falling behind “new 
attorney” (19.3%), “motions” (14.5%), “new agency” (9.2%), and equal to 
“defense attorney unready” (8.7%) as a source of trial delay). 
 3. This outline cites many unreported opinions. The court of appeals has 
held that litigants may cite unpublished opinions, not as binding precedent, but 
for “whatever persuasive power” the opinion may hold. McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 
757, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
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I.  THE PROSECUTOR’S DUE PROCESS DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS 
AND ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS 
The place to begin any examination of a prosecutor’s due process 
and ethical responsibilities is Justice Sutherland’s oft-quoted description 
of the role of a prosecutor: 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party 
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike 
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to 
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.4 
A. Constitutional Sources of the Prosecutor’s Discovery Obligation 
A prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory information to a 
criminal defendant is not rooted in state or federal court rules, but rather 
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A defendant’s 
constitutional right to prepare and present a full defense at trial entitles 
him to disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence.5 
In Brady v. Maryland,6 the defendant and his accomplice were found 
guilty of murder in the first degree and were sentenced to death.7 They 
were convicted at separate trials.8 At his trial, Brady testified and 
admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that his accomplice 
was the actual killer.9 Prior to Brady’s trial, his lawyer demanded to 
examine his accomplice’s police statements.10 Several were shown to 
him, but the prosecution withheld one statement in which the 
accomplice admitted the actual homicide.11 The prosecution did not 
disclose the statement until after Brady had been tried, convicted, 
sentenced to death, and had his conviction affirmed.12 
 
 4. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 5. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). 
 6. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 7. Id. at 84. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found that due process was 
violated where the prosecution suppresses evidence which is either 
material to guilt or to punishment, regardless of the good faith or malice 
of the prosecution: “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted 
but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of 
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”13 
In Giglio v. United States,14 the Court expanded this rule to cover 
exculpatory impeachment evidence.15 Next, in United States v. Agurs,16 
the Court further extended the Brady principle and held that a 
prosecutor has a constitutional duty to voluntarily disclose exculpatory 
information to the defense, even in the absence of a specific defense 
request.17 Finally, in Kyles v. Whitley,18 the Court held that the prosecutor 
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on 
its behalf in the case, including the police.19 
The Brady-Giglio-Kyles rule thus extends the prosecutor’s obligation 
to not only ensure that all exculpatory information is provided to the 
defense but also undertake reasonable steps to ensure that the 
prosecutor is aware of all such material in the government’s possession. 
Because this line of cases stems from the defendant’s Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the prosecutor’s obligation 
is independent of any state discovery court rule or statute. 
B. A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty: Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 
3.8(d) 
In addition to a prosecutor’s due process obligations, Alaska’s 
Rules of Professional Conduct impose an ethical duty upon prosecutors 
to disclose exculpatory or mitigating evidence to the defense.20 
 
 13. Id. at 87. 
 14. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 15. Id. at 154.  
 16. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 17. Id. at 111–13; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) 
(abolishing distinction between the defense’s specific and generalized requests 
for disclosure). 
 18. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 19. Id. at 437. 
 20. Anecdotally, it seems no Alaska prosecutor has ever faced professional 
discipline for violations of this rule. According to Bar Counsel Steve Van Goor, 
complaints filed under this rule with the Alaska Bar Association are infrequent, 
and none has ever resulted in formal professional discipline. E-mail from Steve 
Van Goor, Bar Counsel, Alaska Bar Ass’n, to Author (Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with 
author). Mr. Van Goor has been bar counsel since 1983. 
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Rule 3.8 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct (Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor) states that a prosecutor in a criminal 
case shall: 
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection 
with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all 
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, 
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by 
a protective order of the tribunal . . . .21 
Therefore, the prosecutor is ethically bound to make available to 
the defense evidentiary material that must be disclosed under the due 
process requirements established in Brady and Alaska Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16(b)(3). Interestingly, at sentencing, the professional 
responsibility rule requires disclosure of mitigating information to the 
court as well as to the defendant. In contrast, the criminal procedure rule 
only requires disclosure to the court if new information emerges at 
trial.22 
II.  A SURVEY OF CRIMINAL RULE 16: WHAT DISCLOSURE IS 
EXPRESSLY REQUIRED BY ALASKA’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE? 
Discovery in criminal cases is governed by Criminal Rule 16.23 
Alaska’s Criminal Rule 16 was promulgated by supreme court order and 
became effective in 1973.24 The supreme court essentially adopted most 
 
 21. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(d). This rule remained unchanged through 
the recent major revision of Alaska’s professional legal ethics code. See 
Rescinding the Current Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct & Readopting 
New Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct, Supreme Court Order 1680, effective 
Apr. 15, 2009, http://state.ak.us/courts/sco/sco1680.pdf. 
 22. Compare ALASKA R. PROF. RESP. 3.8(d) (disclosure to court and defense at 
sentencing), with ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3) (disclosure only to defense), and 
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2) (disclosure to court only if newly discovered 
information emerges in trial). 
 23. Criminal discovery practice is not governed by the Alaska Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Thomas v. State, No. A-6015, 1997 WL 235504, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 7, 1997) (“Discovery in criminal cases is not governed by Civil Rules 26 et 
seq., but rather by Criminal Rule 16(b)–(d).”); Jerrel v. State, Nos. A-3380, A-3873, 
1992 WL 12153274, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1992) (criminal discovery rules 
govern criminal cases), rev’d on other grounds, Allen v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 168 P.3d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 24. Supreme Court Order 157, effective Feb. 15, 1973. Alaska Supreme Court 
Order 157 is only available in print at the Anchorage, Fairbanks, and Juneau law 
libraries. Copies can be obtained by contacting the Anchorage Law Library. See 
http://state.ak.us/courts/sco.htm. 
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of the provisions of the 1970 American Bar Association Standards for 
Criminal Justice, “Discovery and Procedure Before Trial,” Standard 
2.1(a).25 
With the 1973 enactment of Criminal Rule 16, the largely “one-
way” traffic pattern of Alaska’s criminal discovery process was set:26 
criminal defendants were granted broad criminal discovery rights but 
bore few obligations in return. The new rule required the prosecutor to 
disclose, for the first time, names and addresses of prospective 
witnesses, written or recorded witness statements, defendant and co-
defendant statements, and expert reports.27 In contrast, the defendant 
was merely required to submit to non-testimonial identification 
procedures and to provide notice of intent to raise an insanity defense; 
disclosure of prospective defense expert witnesses was discretionary.28 
As we will see, this traffic pattern resembles a busy commuter highway 
at morning rush hour: most information heads “inbound” in the defense 
direction, and little traffic flows the other way. With few exceptions, that 
portrait remains essentially unchanged today.  
A. Witness Identity, Statements, and Criminal Conviction Records 
Criminal Rule 16(b)(1) states that the prosecutor shall disclose: 
(i)  The names and addresses of persons known . . . to have 
knowledge of relevant facts and their written or recorded 
statements or summaries of statements;29  
(ii)  Any written or recorded statements and summaries of 
statements and the substance of any oral statements made 
by the accused;  
(iii) Any written or recorded statements and summaries of 
statements and the substance of any oral statements made 
by a co-defendant; 
 
 25. See Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), 
disapproved in part on other grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999). 
 26. Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 784 (Alaska 1974) (“[P]retrial criminal 
discovery is not a ‘two-way street.’”). 
 27. Supreme Court Order 157, supra note 24. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.060 (2008) (“After a witness called by the state 
has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, 
order the state to produce any statement of the witness in the possession of the 
state that relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the 
entire contents of the statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of 
the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for 
examination and use.”). 
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(iv) Any books, papers, documents, photographs or tangible 
objects, which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in 
the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or 
belong to the accused; and  
(v)  Any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant 
and of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to 
call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.30 
As explained above, Alaska’s discovery rule was based on the 1970 
American Bar Association (ABA) Standards. However, in this very first 
substantive section, we encounter some critical differences between the 
ABA Standards and the Alaska rule. For example, the ABA Standards 
required the prosecutor only to disclose the statements of persons the 
prosecutor “intended” to call at trial.31 If the prosecutor subjectively 
decided not to call the witness (or so claimed later), then the witness’s 
statement need not be disclosed. The Alaska Supreme Court specifically 
rejected this limitation when it adopted Alaska Criminal Rule 16. Under 
the rule, the triggering criterion is relevance, not the prosecutor’s 
intent.32 
Second, the ABA Standards only required disclosure of a co-
defendant’s statement if the trial was to be a joint trial.33 In addition, the 
ABA Standards required disclosure of “written or recorded 
statements.”34 The Alaska rule broadened this requirement to include 
“written or recorded statements or summaries of statements” of 
defendants and co-defendants.35 
Despite these changes, the Alaska rule retained an important 
distinction regarding disclosure of unrecorded, non-codefendant 
witness statements. The Alaska Supreme Court followed the ABA 
Standards and omitted the phrase “the substance of any oral 
statements” from section (b)(1)(i). 36 
In other words, the prosecutor is required to disclose “written and 
recorded statements” of all persons with knowledge of relevant facts. 
 
 30. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A). 
 31. See Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1979) (explaining the 
distinction between the ABA Standard and the Alaska rule). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Shaw v. State, No. A-3697, 1992 WL 12153173, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. May 
6, 1992). 
 34. Howe, 589 P.2d at 424. 
 35. Shaw, 1992 WL 12153173, at *9 (explaining these distinctions between the 
1970 ABA Standards and Alaska Criminal Rule 16). 
 36. Id. (explaining why the Government was not required to create and 
disclose the “substance,” or a summary, of a witness’s unrecorded oral 
interview). 
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Yet, the prosecutor must disclose “summaries of statements and the 
substance of any oral statements” only of the accused and any co-
defendant.37 This quirk governs a frequently encountered criminal trial 
practice issue: the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose new information 
revealed in a pre-trial, unrecorded interview with a percipient witness. 
The rule’s first clause requires disclosure of the names and 
addresses of witnesses and disclosure of their “written or recorded” 
statements. However, the rule does not require disclosure of the 
“substance” of a mere witness’s oral statement. The court of appeals 
discussed this distinction in Sivertsen v. State.38 
Sivertsen was charged with burglary.39 At trial, a witness testified 
that the hammer and knife Sivertsen possessed when arrested came 
from inside the burglarized premises.40 The prosecutor learned this 
inculpatory fact when he interviewed the witness a week before trial but 
did not disclose this fact to the defense.41 When the prosecutor elicited 
these facts at trial, the defense alleged a discovery violation.42 The court 
of appeals rejected the claim, explaining that the prosecutor had no duty 
to disclose a summary of an unrecorded oral statement made during a 
trial preparation interview.43 
As the Sivertsen court recognized, this quirk creates the potential for 
a clever prosecutor to avoid disclosure and cultivate unfair surprise by 
 
 37. See Hampton v. State, 623 P.2d 318, 319–20 (Alaska 1981) (finding error 
where police chief did not inform prosecutor or defense attorney of an 
unrecorded oral statement of the accused and police chief disclosed the 
statement in response to cross-examination question in the midst of trial); see also 
Marshall v. State, 198 P.3d 567, 574 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (holding a state’s 
failure to disclose a recorded interview with a cooperating informant constituted 
a discovery violation). Where a pretrial interview discloses a statement 
attributable to the defendant, reported by a third-party witness, the substance of 
that statement is discoverable, whether the witness’s interview is recorded or 
not. Id. 
 38. 963 P.2d 1069, 1071–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), disapproved in part on other 
grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Criminal Rule 16(b)(1) does not 
normally require a prosecutor to disclose oral statements made by a witness 
during a trial preparation interview); see also Nook v. State, No. A-7837, 2004 WL 
1336268, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 2004) (same); Buie v. State, No. A-4706, 
1995 WL 17220362, at *10–11 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1995) (applying this 
principle and finding no violation where prosecutor failed to disclose content of 
fifteen minute mid-trial conversation with state’s expert medical examiner); 
Shaw, 1992 WL 12153173, at *7–10 (discussing this point at length). 
 39. Sivertsen, 963 P.2d at 1070. 
 40. Id. at 1070–72. 
 41. Id. at 1071. 
 42. Id. at 1070–71. 
 43. Id. 
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doggedly refusing to record or create a written “summary” of an oral, 
unrecorded, pre-trial witness interview.44 
In fact, the court of appeals had squarely confronted this allegation 
years earlier in Elson v. State.45 In Elson, the victim of a sexual assault 
initially lied to police when she denied that she had been using cocaine 
with Elson before the sexual assault.46 The victim admitted this lie on 
cross examination, but the prosecutor rehabilitated her testimony by 
asking, “Did you, within a short time after that, call our office to indicate 
that you had not told the truth about the slip of cocaine?”47 The victim 
said she had.48 
Elson’s counsel objected and alleged a discovery violation.49 She 
argued that she had planned her whole attack on the victim’s credibility 
based on the victim’s failure to candidly disclose drug use.50 She claimed 
that the prosecutor’s rehabilitation had ambushed her because the 
prosecutor had never disclosed the victim’s self-report.51 
The court of appeals held that there was no discovery violation 
because the victim’s self-report was not reduced to writing.52 In other 
words, because the informal telephone call was (seemingly) not 
documented in writing or tape-recorded, the failure to disclose the 
statement did not run afoul of Rule 16. 
However, Elson’s appellate attorney raised a powerful argument: 
the prosecutor’s office must have reduced the victim’s self-report to 
writing in some form.53 How else could the prosecutor have been able to 
provide the approximate time frame of the self-report telephone call in 
his rehabilitating question? In fact, Elson’s appellate attorney pointed 
out that the prosecutor had referred to the date of the victim’s telephone 
call during argument.54 Unfortunately, the court of appeals dodged this 
issue and held that Elson had not raised this precise argument in the 
trial court.55 The issue had been litigated in the trial court as if the self-
 
 44. See id. at 1072 (“We recognize that this interpretation of Criminal Rule 
16(b)(1)(i) could be abused.”). 
 45. Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823 (Alaska Ct. App. Jul. 28, 1993). 
 46. Id. at *2 n.1. 
 47. Id. at *11. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at *12. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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report was not reduced to writing; therefore, Elson had waived the claim 
on appeal.56 
Do Alaska’s criminal rules offer any remedy to this problem? Yes. 
Although Rule 16(b)(1) does not require the prosecutor to create and 
disclose a witness’s pre-trial interview,57 Rule 16(b)(3) (and Brady itself) 
do require disclosure of “exculpatory” information—whether the 
prosecutor has reduced it to writing or not.58 Therefore, a prosecutor 
may not wear Sivertsen or Elson on her sleeve: if her pre-trial interview 
discloses exculpatory information, she must disclose it to the defense 
attorney.59 
Moreover, if the prosecutor learns new facts in a pre-trial (or mid-
trial) posture and fails to disclose those facts to the defense based on an 
expansive reading of Sivertsen, she may be in tiger country. Why? 
Because it is impossible for a prosecutor to conclusively predict whether 
a reviewing judge or appellate court will decide that the newly disclosed 
information was not exculpatory when made. The cautious prosecutor 
should avoid a charge of sharp discovery practice by creating a 
summary of the interview (perhaps even an informal one) and 
disclosing it to the defense. 
Next, prosecutors should be mindful that courts have found error 
where the prosecutor failed to disclose clearly discoverable information 
such as the accused’s own statements and written summaries of witness 
statements.60 As the Rule makes explicitly clear, the government has a 
 
 56. Id. at *14 n.5. Elson is an easy opinion to criticize. The victim’s report of 
mutual drug use could easily be characterized as “exculpatory” or “mitigating” 
within the meaning of Rule 16(b)(3). Therefore, it should have been disclosed to 
the defense. 
 57. Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), disapproved 
in part on other grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999). 
 58. See infra Part II.D. 
 59. See Latonio v. State, No. A-4147, 1993 WL 13156678, at *1 (Alaska Ct. 
App. May 19, 1993) (discussing approvingly a trial judge’s ruling that Rule 16 
required disclosure of exculpatory information regardless of whether a written 
summary had been prepared). 
 60. Hampton v. State, 623 P.2d 318, 319–20 (Alaska 1981) (finding violation 
of Rule 16(b) where the evidence in question was an undisclosed oral statement 
of the defendant, although this was not considered reversible error); Stevens v. 
State, 582 P.2d 621, 624–25 (Alaska 1978) (holding that government’s failure to 
reveal the prior statements of a defense alibi witness was reversible error); 
Mahle v. State, 371 P.2d 21, 22–24 (Alaska 1962) (holding that police reports of 
oral statements by witnesses should have been disclosed under former statute 
governing discovery); Braaten v. State, 705 P.2d 1311, 1320 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1985) (“The two page report submitted by the prosecutor was apparently a 
summary of G.J.’s statements to the police concerning her activities during the 
period Braaten claimed he met her. The complaining witness, G.J., was clearly a 
person ‘known by the government to have knowledge of relevant facts,’ so that 
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duty to make pretrial disclosure of all “summaries of statements and the 
substance of any oral statements made by the accused.”61 Most 
commonly, this rule will trigger disclosure of statements made by an 
accused directly to a law enforcement officer.62 However, it is unclear 
whether a statement that is made in open court, and therefore equally 
available to all parties, must be disclosed in formal criminal discovery.63 
The government’s duty to disclose names of witnesses “known” to 
have relevant evidence is broad and includes persons “known” to have 
relevant information, even if the police conclude that the witness’s 
information is cumulative of other witnesses, and they decline to 
formally interview the witness.64 
The government’s duty to disclose information under this 
subsection is self-executing, and it may not rely on the defense’s failure 
to make a specific request.65 
 
the summary of her statements on any area of the investigation would seem to 
fall within the scope of Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(i).”). 
 61. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 62. Alaska law has long required that a suspect’s custodial interrogation in a 
place of detention be audio recorded. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159–60 
(Alaska 1985). 
 63. Riney v. State, 935 P.2d 828, 838 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (where the 
accused made inculpatory statements to the magistrate at his bail hearing, “it 
was just five dollars’ worth [of cocaine] I just forgot it was in my pocket . . .”; the 
prosecutor noted the statements in her file, but did not disclose them to the 
defense lawyer until trial; the defendant was not entitled to suppression of the 
statements; court characterized the discoverable nature of the in-court 
statements as “a close question.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Jurco v. State, No. A-4983, 1995 WL 17220755, at *2–4(Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 5, 1995) (requiring state to turn over identity of witness when state 
knows of witness and there is “substantial probability” that witness has 
knowledge of facts of case, even if state declines to interview witness). This 
principle applies only where the police have actually gathered the questioned 
evidence or are actually aware of the identity of the particular witness. Due 
process does not require the police to use state-of-the-art investigative 
techniques in every reported crime, or to actually gather the names of every 
conceivable witness at every crime scene. But, “[e]vidence in question should 
not be destroyed based on an investigating officer’s evaluation of its usefulness.” 
Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 n.5 (Alaska 1978). See also Singleton v. State, 921 
P.2d 636, 639–40 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (finding no due process violation where 
police failed to record names of bystanders at crime scene). Cf. Nicholson v. 
State, 570 P.2d 1058, 1064 (Alaska 1977) (requiring the state to track down “every 
conceivable investigative lead” would be an “extremely difficult burden for the 
state”); March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 716 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (the due process 
clause does not require a state-of-the-art investigation of all crimes). 
 65. Rodes v. City of Kenai, No. A-5536, 1996 WL 33686482, at *4–5 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996) (holding that prosecution may move for ex parte, in 
camera review and may seek restriction or deferral, but the burden is on the 
prosecution to take those steps). 
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A prosecutor may not suppress Rule 16(b)(1) evidence by styling 
the information as “rebuttal” testimony. That was apparently the rule in 
Alaska between 1975 and 1979 but has now been overruled.66 
What about the discoverability of witnesses’ “full arrest record”? 
Rule 16(b)(1)(A)(v) only requires disclosure of “convictions,” and then, 
only of “persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as 
witnesses at . . . trial.”67 What if the defense demands a printout of “all 
police contacts” or “all arrests”—whether or not the contact resulted in a 
conviction? Such a request would be beyond the scope of Rule 
16(b)(1)(A)(v). But, if a defender articulates particular relevance (or 
“materiality”) to the arrest record of a particular witness (such as a 
police informant), the request would fall within the scope of Rule 
16(b)(7).68 The rule’s link between the prosecutor’s subjective intention 
and her disclosure obligation is problematic. The Howe court articulated 
the flaw with tying a discovery obligation to the prosecutor’s subjective 
intention. The rule mistakenly assumes that at an early stage in the case, 
the prosecutor will be able to predict, with precision, the identity of the 
witnesses she intends to call months later at trial. But, as the Howe court 
explained, this is often not the case. A prosecutor often cannot predict 
witness availability and degree of witness cooperation at an early stage 
of the litigation.69 Also, in street crime prosecution, given the volume of 
casework in a hectic prosecution office, serious trial preparation does 
not occur until shortly before trial.70 Additionally, the defense is not 
required to reveal its specific defense theory until ten days before trial.71 
Each of those variables may change the precise identity of trial 
witnesses. 
For example, in Coney v. State,72 the defense demanded a copy of 
the robbery victim’s full arrest record because, according to the defense, 
the victim fabricated the robbery report.73 The trial judge refused to 
order its production.74 On appeal, the court of appeals remanded, 
reasoning that if the victim had reported a crime or had been a suspect, 
 
 66. See Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 346 n.4 (Alaska 1991) (overruling old 
rule and not allowing prosecutor to suppress self-styled rebuttal evidence); 
Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979) (overruling McCurry v. State, 538 P.2d 
100 (Alaska 1975)). 
 67. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(v). 
 68. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(7). 
 69. Howe, 589 P.2d at 424 n.7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5). 
 72. 699 P.2d 899 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 73. Id. at 900. 
 74. Id. at 901. 
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the printout might have led to impeachment evidence.75 Because the 
court could not determine what all the abbreviations on the police 
printout meant, it could not determine whether the printout was 
discoverable and remanded to allow the defense to inspect the printout 
and argue its materiality.76 Contemporary Alaska criminal defense 
practitioners often rely on Coney when seeking full arrest records of state 
witnesses.77 
In Braham v. State,78 the supreme court confronted a similar 
problem.79 Police reports that revealed a critical prosecution witness’s 
dealings with the police as an informant in drug cases had been 
withheld from the defendant.80 The court held that the reports should 
have been disclosed “because they showed that [the witness] was deeply 
involved in working for the police, which would create the material 
inference that he might be biased in favor of the prosecution.”81 
Thus, defense counsel should argue that Braham supports a defense 
request for reports involving an informant’s participation in an 
undercover operation. Defense counsel should also cite Coney and Rule 
16(b)(7) in support of a request for full arrest records of important 
witnesses. Prosecutors should argue that these cases are limited to 
critical government witnesses and should review a defense discovery 
demand for a showing of “materiality.”82 Prosecutors should argue for 
in camera review under Rule 16(d)(6)(i) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
B. Government Expert Disclosure 
Rule 16(b)(1)(B) states that, “as soon as known and no later than 45 
days prior to trial,” the prosecutor shall disclose: (1) The name and 
address of each expert witness who performed work in connection with 
the case or who is likely to be called at trial; (2) Any reports or written 
statements of the expert; (3) A curriculum vitae; and (4) A “written 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. As a practical matter, Coney’s impact has been blunted over time. The 
Alaska Public Defender Agency and the Alaska Office of Public Advocacy’s 
investigative staffs now have online access to the full arrest and conviction 
records of every criminal defendant in Alaska via the Alaska Public Safety 
Information Network (ASPIN) database. See Ingles v. State, Nos. A-6157, A-3731, 
1997 WL 796504, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1997) (mentioning Public 
Defender Agency APSIN access). 
 78. 571 P.2d 631 (Alaska 1977). 
 79. Id. at 641–48. 
 80. Id. at 642–43. 
 81. Id. at 647. 
 82. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(7). 
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description of the substance of the proposed testimony of the expert, the 
expert’s opinion, and the underlying basis of that opinion.”83 
This rule has sanction and timing components. The court may 
impose sanctions, including preclusion, for violations.84 Absent contrary 
specific order, government expert discovery is to be accomplished no 
later than forty-five days prior to trial.85 
Prosecutors should note that the rule’s first clause is written 
disjunctively; it directs discovery of experts who are likely to be called or 
who have performed work on the case.86 In other words, if expert work 
yields seemingly inconclusive results, the expert’s identity, report, and 
resume must be discovered. The prosecutor may not suppress the 
results because she regards the test as “neutral” or inconclusive and 
then subjectively abandons any intent to call the expert at trial.87 
The court of appeals has questioned whether the expert discovery 
rule pertains to testimony from a police officer who testifies as an 
“expert” based upon police experience. In Collins v. State,88 the court of 
appeals expressed doubt that expert discovery rules applied to a police 
detective who testified about the similarity of crack houses to the 
defendant’s apartment.89 “[I]t is not clear to us that Criminal Rule 
16(b)(1)(B) applies to police officers, like Bryant, who testify to their on-
the-scene observations and conclusions based on their training and 
experience.”90 Collins and Basurto v. State91 are consistent with an 
emerging line of cases that hold police officers and other professionals 
who offer opinion testimony based on a combination of on-scene 
 
 83. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). 
 84. Id. Criminal Rule 16(e) also authorizes sanctions for “willful” discovery 
violations.  See Davis v. Superior Court, Fourth Judicial Dist., No. A-3114, 1990 
WL 10509739, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. June 13, 1990) (affirming $25 sanction 
against the Fairbanks District Attorney). 
 85. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). Notwithstanding the rule’s text, the court 
of appeals held that the remedy for late notice under this rule is a continuance, 
not preclusion. Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *5–
6 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002). 
 86. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B). 
 87. Mujahid v. State, No. A-9573, 2008 WL 4757152, at *2–4 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Oct. 29, 2008) (holding that whether crime lab result was “neutral” or 
“exculpatory” was irrelevant and the test result was discoverable pursuant to 
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B)). 
 88. 977 P.2d 741 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 89. Id. at 745. 
 90. Id. (failing to decide this issue, noting that the proper remedy for non-
compliance with discovery under this rule would have been a continuance). 
 91. No. A-8010, 2003 WL 23011812, at *8 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2003) 
(police sergeant testimony that did not rest on scientific research “does not 
appear to be the type of ‘expert’ testimony covered by the pre-trial discovery 
provisions of Alaska Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(B )”). 
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observation, training, and experience are not “experts” to whom full 
pre-trial disclosure obligations apply. These witnesses are deemed to be 
“hybrid” witnesses, exempt from Rule 16 disclosure obligations.92 
Must each expert witness supply the defense with the scientific 
studies that support her expert opinion? The court of appeals has 
implied, at least in a case where an expert has not relied “on any 
particular study,” that the answer is no.93 
C. Informant and Surveillance Information 
Rule 16(b)(2) states that the prosecuting attorneys shall inform 
defense counsel: 
(i)  of any relevant material or information relating to the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant which has been provided by 
an informant, and 
(ii)  of any electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, of 
(aa)  conversations to which the accused or the accused’s 
attorney was a party, [and] 
(bb)  premises of the accused or the accused’s attorney.94 
Note that search warrant disclosure should be addressed at the 
charging stage. Alaska Criminal Rule 37(e)(2) requires that the 
prosecutor shall disclose the court numbers of all search warrants “in 
relation to the case” on the “initial charging document,” unless the court 
waives this requirement for “good cause shown.”95 
In a situation involving an ongoing criminal investigation 
(especially if the safety of confidential informants or undercover officers 
is involved), the prosecutor should seek an ex parte, in camera order 
 
 92. See Getchell v. Lodge, 65 P.3d 50, 55–56 (Alaska 2003) (state trooper who 
offered his opinion of cause of traffic collision based on his on-scene 
observations and training was a "hybrid" witness); Voyles v. State, Nos. A-9377, 
A-9397, 2008 WL 4951416, at *8 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2008) (police crime 
scene analyst); Hunter v. State, No. 8868, 2007 WL 2405208, at *12–13 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Aug. 22, 2007) (specially-trained sexual assault nurse). 
 93. Calix v. State, No. A-6854, 1999 WL 34002417, at *4–5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Oct. 13, 1999) (rejecting claimed discovery violation where expert relied on 
examination of the victim and on her years of professional experience and not 
upon any “particular studies”); Bremond v. State, No. A-5019, 1994 WL 
16196672, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (affirming admission of expert 
testimony about scientific studies even though the studies had not been 
disclosed in pretrial discovery). 
 94. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2). 
 95. The court rule governing the content of the initial charging document 
repeats this requirement. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 3(e) (requiring complaint to 
have “a listing of the numbers of any search warrants issued in relation to the 
case”). 
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deferring discovery pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 16(d)(4) and 
(6)(ii).96 
D. All Exculpatory Evidence 
 Rule 16(b)(3) states, “The prosecutor shall disclose to defense 
counsel any material or information within the prosecuting attorney’s 
possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as 
to the offense or would tend to reduce the accused’s punishment 
therefor.”97 
This rule is really a codification of the Brady-Giglio holdings.98 In 
Batson v. State,99 the Alaska Supreme Court stated that this rule 
essentially parallels Brady and held that the prosecution was required to 
disclose the record of undercover narcotics officers’ “non-drug” expense 
logs in the course of an investigation.100 Batson relied on an entrapment 
theory and hoped to establish that the undercover officers “bought” the 
defendants’ trust and friendship over a five-month period by giving 
them gifts, loans, drinks, and promises of financial reward.101 The court 
held that denial of the discovery request was error, citing this rule.102 
E. The Extent of the Prosecutor’s Obligation 
Rule 16(b)(4) states: 
The prosecuting attorney’s [discovery] obligations extend to 
material and information in the possession or control of 
(i)  members of the prosecuting attorney’s staff, and 
(ii) any others who have participated in the investigation or 
evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or 
with reference to the particular case have reported to the 
prosecuting attorney’s office.103 
 
 96. See infra Part IV.D. 
 97. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3). 
 98. See supra Part I.A. 
 99. 568 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1977). 
 100. Id. at 980. 
 101. Id. at 978–79. 
 102. Id. See Elson v. State, Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823, at *14 
(Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993) (stating that Rule 16(b)(3) and Brady had the same 
function: requiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence). The court said that 
“even though Rule 16(b)(1)(i) does not require disclosure of [informal pretrial] 
oral statements . . . due process still limits the prosecutor’s ability to withhold 
the details of witnesses’ statements from the defense”). Id. 
 103. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4). 
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The government’s discovery obligation extends to the police 
agency responsible for investigating the case. Under this rule, the 
knowledge of the officer is essentially imputed to the prosecution.104 
In Butler v. State,105 the court of appeals considered mid-trial 
disclosure of a 911 dispatch log.106 The case arose from Palmer, where an 
interagency office maintains the 911 emergency communications center. 
In Butler, the 911 logs precisely identified the date and time of a citizen’s 
complaint of a man exposing himself to children,107 but the dispatch log 
was only discovered and disclosed in the midst of Butler’s trial.108 
Clarifying the date and time of the exposure event, the log powerfully 
corroborated the witness’s trial testimony.109 
Writing for the court, Judge Mannheimer noticed and commented 
upon an intriguing aspect of the case: at trial, the parties simply assumed 
that knowledge of the dispatch log was imputed to the prosecution 
under Criminal Rule 16(b)(4)(ii) and was therefore subject to automatic 
pretrial disclosure.110 The judge implied that the imputed-knowledge 
conclusion was unsound and that the interagency group which operated 
the regional 911 switchboard might not fall within the ambit of Rule 
16(b)(4)(ii).111 However technically intriguing, the approach Judge 
Mannheimer tacitly suggests is not persuasive. The record of the case 
was clear that the interagency communications center “participated in 
the investigation” and “had reported” to the prosecutor’s office in the 
sense that multiple 911 calls triggered the police investigation.112 It is 
 
 104. Hampton v. State, 623 P.2d 318, 320 n.1 (Alaska 1981) (police chief’s 
knowledge of unrecorded statement of defendant imputed to prosecution); 
Russell v. Anchorage, 626 P.2d 586, 590–91 n.14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981); see also 
O’Neill v. State, 675 P.2d 1288, 1292 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (Singleton, J., 
concurring) (writing for himself, Judge Singleton concluded, intriguingly, that 
this issue was governed by agency principles, and that an officer’s “private 
audio recording” of a disputed arrest, which he made to protect himself from 
civil lawsuit, was not within the “scope of his employment,” and therefore, the 
State’s discovery obligation did not attach to the tape; in view of the sparse 
subsequent citations to Judge Singleton’s concurrence, his approach does not 
seem to have achieved broad acceptance). 
 105. No. A-5399, 2008 WL 4890238 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008). 
 106. Id. at *1. 
 107. Id. at *6–7. 
 108. Id. at *1. 
 109. Id. at *7–13. Butler argued that the mid-trial disclosure of the dispatch log 
prejudiced him because it undercut his alibi defense. Id. at *1. The court of 
appeals ultimately rejected this claim, noting that Butler had elected to proceed 
to trial, even though he knew that there was considerable imprecision regarding 
the date of the offense. Id. at *12. 
 110. Id. at *10. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *2; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(4)(ii). 
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equally clear that the center had a close working relationship with the 
investigating police agency and the district attorney’s office.113 
A ruling that the 911 emergency communications center was not 
subject to Rule 16(b) discovery would frustrate the rule’s fundamental 
purposes: facilitation of informed pleas, expedition of trial, and 
minimization of trial surprise.114 The ruling would also trigger 
indefensibly contrary results in Alaskan communities like Palmer-
Wasilla, where the 911 center is staffed by interagency personnel, and 
Anchorage, where a single municipal police agency staffs the 911 
emergency center. Therefore, if this issue is ever squarely presented in 
another case, a prosecutor should assume that a trial judge would 
impute knowledge of 911 emergency dispatch center data to the 
prosecuting agency under Rule 16(b)(4)(ii). 
F. The Defense Power to Compel Production of Favorable   
Information 
 Rule 16(b)(5) states that: 
Whenever defense counsel designates and requests production 
of material or information which is not in the possession or 
control of the prosecuting attorney but would be discoverable 
if in the possession or control of the prosecuting attorney, the 
court shall issue suitable subpoenas or orders to cause such 
material to be made available to defense counsel.115 
This rule, combined with Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) (which requires a 
showing of “materiality”) and with Criminal Rule 17(c), gives the 
defense broad powers of subpoena and protects a defendant’s due 
process and compulsory process rights.116 
Where the police have not collected evidence and the defense seeks 
it, the proper procedural vehicle is a defense motion for a Rule 17(c) 
 
 113. Butler, 2008 WL 4890238, at *6–7 (describing prosecution’s free access to 
911 dispatch database). 
 114. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a). 
 115. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(5). 
 116. See Page v. State, Nos. A-3551, A-5754, 1997 WL 45119, at *5–6 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1997) (holding that defendant was “probably entitled” to an 
order for a subpoena compelling sexual victim’s physician to disclose her 
prescription records for in camera inspection). The Page court noted that Alaska 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) contemplates document “production before the 
court” and the court’s determination regarding further disclosure to the parties, 
not direct delivery by the custodian to an attorney. Id. at *6 n.7. 
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subpoena deuces tecum, issued under authority of Rule 16(b)(5).117 In 
Short v. Municipality of Anchorage,118 the defendant requested security 
tapes that were not collected by the police department, and, by the time 
of trial, the parties learned that one security camera had malfunctioned 
and the other tape had been erased.119 The court of appeals found no 
discovery violation because the police had no duty to collect the tapes as 
evidence and Short offered no “explanation why he could not have 
subpoenaed the tapes earlier under Criminal Rule 17.”120 
In Fathke v. State,121 the court of appeals relied on Rule 17(c) and 
held that a defendant may invoke it to compel an order requiring “other 
suspects” to submit to non-testimonial identification procedures.122 
Fathke sought an order to compel a specific third party to provide inked 
fingerprint and palm print samples.123 The defense argued that the third 
party was responsible for a latent print left on an item at the scene of a 
robbery, but the trial court denied the motion.124 The court of appeals 
reversed, finding the denial an abuse of discretion.125 Fathke is an 
important Rule 17(c) case. Every defender should have its holding in her 
back pocket. 
G. Search, Seizure, and Witness “Relationship” Information 
Rule 16(b)(6) states that: 
[T]he prosecuting attorney shall, upon request of defense 
counsel, disclose and permit inspection, testing, copying and 
 
 117. Rule 16(b)(5) is not an unlimited license for a defense demand for 
production of every imaginable document. The rule requires a showing that the 
information sought, “would be discoverable if in the possession or control of the 
prosecuting attorney . . . .” Id.  Therefore, if the document would not have been 
discoverable under Rule 16(b), the defense may not rely upon Rule 16(b)(5). 
Rather, the defense must make a reasonable showing of “materiality” under 
Rule 16(b)(7). 
 118. Nos. A-6825, A-3982, 1999 WL 60993 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1999). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. Here is a clear example of what could have been a proper defense use 
of Rule 16(b)(5) and Rule 17(c). If the police had seized these tapes, they would 
clearly have been discoverable under Rule 16(b)(1)(ii)–(iii) (recorded statements) 
and probably also under Rule 16(b)(1)(iv) (photographs or documents intended 
to be introduced by prosecution at trial). Therefore, had the defender spotted the 
issue before trial, the tapes would have been a proper subject of a Rule 16(b)(5) 
and Rule 17(c) subpoena. 
 121. 951 P.2d 1226 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). 
 122. Id. at 1229–30. 
 123. Id. at 1227–28. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1230. 
FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC 5/8/2009  2:30:56 PM 
68 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
photographing of any relevant material and information 
regarding: 
(i)  Specified searches and seizures; 
(ii) The acquisition of specified statements from the accused; 
and 
(iii) The relationship, if any, of specified witnesses to the 
prosecuting authority.126 
This rule essentially codifies Giglio because “the relationship” 
between witnesses and the prosecuting authority refers to incentives or 
inducements to testify. Note that the rule does not distinguish between 
tacit “deals” or express ones. If the witness has been extended any 
promise or inducement, Giglio, its progeny, and this rule require 
disclosure of those facts to the defense.127 
In “undercover informant” and “ongoing investigation” scenarios, 
this rule will often implicate the government’s ability to seek ex parte, in 
camera review of the relationship between cooperating witnesses and 
the police under Rule 16(d)(6). The Alaska Supreme Court has approved 
resolution of “informant” issues, ex parte, and in camera.128 
H. The Discovery Obligation Does Not Extend to the Prosecutor’s  
 Work Product 
Rule 16(b)(8) states that the prosecutor is not required to disclose 
“legal research or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to 
the extent that they contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the 
prosecuting attorney or members of the prosecuting attorney’s legal 
staff.”129 
The court has relied on this rule to affirm denials of defense 
requests to compel production of a prosecutor’s proposed list of 
questions to an expert witness,130 in-house potential juror voir dire 
 
 126. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(6). 
 127. See, e.g., Carman v. State, 604 P.2d 1076, 1080–82 (Alaska 1979) In this 
case, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction when the 
prosecutor failed to disclose that the informant, who was later a trial witness, 
sought a reward when he contacted the police and was subsequently paid $1500 
shortly after trial. Id. at 1079–80. The court concluded that the error was 
compounded by the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which he suggested that 
the informant “had no motive to lie.” Id. at 1080. 
 128. See Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 643 (Alaska 1977) (approving use of ex 
parte, in camera hearings to resolve issues regarding informants and ongoing 
investigations). 
 129. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(8). 
 130. Thomas v. State, No. A-6015, 1997 WL 235504, at *8–9 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 7, 1997). 
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information,131 and the chief investigating officer’s in-court notes made 
during trial.132 
III.  WHAT INFORMATION MUST THE DEFENSE GIVE THE 
PROSECUTOR? CRIMINAL RULE 16(c) 
Alaskan defendants have never been subject to broad disclosure 
requirements of their defense investigations, work product, or planned 
cases-in-chief. Scott v. State133 is the seminal Alaska case regarding 
defense pre-trial disclosure. In Scott, the Alaska Supreme Court found 
that a trial court’s order compelling broad discovery of the defense 
case134 violated the defendant’s right to remain silent under Article I, 
section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.135 However, the court upheld a 
pretrial order requiring the defendant to disclose his intention to present 
an alibi defense, reasoning that the general nature of the trial defense 
was analogous to a “pre-trial plea” and therefore was not privileged.136 
In 1995, the Alaska Supreme Court expanded defendants’ pre-trial 
discovery obligations. The court amended Criminal Rule 16(c) to require 
criminal defendants to disclose the general nature of some statutory and 
special trial defenses, provide increased expert discovery, and surrender 
physical evidence.137 In addition, criminal defendants may be subject to 
non-testimonial identification orders.138 
 
 131. Ingles v. State, Nos. A-6157, A-3731, 1997 WL 796504, at *2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Dec. 24, 1997); Hiser v. State, No. A-4980, 1994 WL 16196673, at *1 n.1 
(Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994). 
 132. Smith v. State, No. A-6183, 1997 WL 688646, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 
5, 1997). 
 133. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). 
 134. These include: the names and addresses of defense witnesses (other than 
the defendant), any written or recorded witness statements, and a list of places 
the defendant claimed to have been pursuant to his alibi defense. Id. at 786. 
 135. Id. at 786–87. 
 136. Id. at 787. 
 137. See Amending Criminal Rule 16 Concerning Discovery in Criminal 
Cases, Supreme Court Order 1191, effective July 15, 1995. For a discussion of the 
1995 amendments to Rule 16, and the unsuccessful 1994 to 1996 attempts to 
impose an “opt-in, opt-out” reciprocal discovery system in Alaska, see Cameron 
J. Williams, Note, Sidestepping Scott: Modifying Criminal Discovery in Alaska, 15 
ALASKA L. REV. 33, 45–49 (1998). The 1995 amendments to Rule 16(c) discussed in 
this section are the sole surviving legacy of the 1994 to 1996 discovery reform 
initiative. 
 138. See Supreme Court Order 1191, supra note 137. 
FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC 5/8/2009  2:30:56 PM 
70 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
A. Non-testimonial Identification 
Criminal Rule 16(c) provides that the prosecutor is entitled to court 
orders mandating that the defendant submit to a variety of non-
testimonial identification procedures. The rule grants a judge authority 
to order a defendant to appear in a line-up; speak certain words; provide 
fingerprints; pose for photographs; try on articles of clothing; provide 
fingernail scrapings, blood, hair and other biological evidence; provide 
handwriting; and permit body inspections.139 But the rule requires a 
probable cause finding that the defendant is a member of a “narrow 
focal group” who could have committed the offense and that the 
evidence cannot be obtained from another source.140 
Therefore, in practice, this aspect of Criminal Rule 16 is practically 
useless to a prosecutor. Why? An application pursuant to this rule offers 
the chance for the defense to actively oppose and delay the prosecutor’s 
request. Also, Rule 16 has no application in cases where a defendant has 
not yet been formally charged with a crime.141 Therefore, Rule 16(c) non-
testimonial identification procedures will rarely be invoked for an 
obvious reason: fundamental fact-gathering regarding the perpetrator’s 
identity should have been gathered before the charging decision was 
made, not afterwards. In practice, a prosecutor (or a detective) seeking 
to gather non-testimonial identification evidence will seek a search 
warrant rather than apply for a Rule 16(c) order.142 
B. Defense Expert Disclosure 
No later than thirty days before trial, the defense is required by 
Criminal Rule 16(c)(4) to provide expert discovery to the prosecution.143 
This rule applies to any expert the defendant is “likely” to call, and 
includes any written statement or report by the expert, a curriculum 
vitae, a written description of the substance of his testimony, his 
 
 139. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(2). 
 140. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(1). 
 141. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1 (stating that criminal procedure rules govern 
practice and procedure in all criminal court “proceedings,” implying that the 
rule’s discovery procedures are inapplicable to uncharged cases). 
 142. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.020(4) (2008) (stating that a judge may issue a 
search warrant for seizure of evidence tending to show the identity of a 
perpetrator). No provision of Alaska law prohibits a prosecutor from seeking a 
search warrant to further a criminal investigation even after formal charges are 
filed. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.010–020 (2008). 
 143. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(4). 
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opinion, and the underlying basis of the opinion.144 The rule includes a 
preclusion component for failure to comply with the rule.145 
The court of appeals recently construed this rule’s “preclusion” 
clause in Harris v. State.146 In Harris, the defense lawyer did not disclose 
a medical expert’s report to the prosecutor until the first day of trial, in 
derogation of this rule and contrary to the judge’s specific order.147 The 
judge found that the defense’s failure was specifically intended to obtain 
tactical advantage and precluded the expert from testifying to any 
matter that was not in the defense lawyer’s previous, cursory 
memorandum to the prosecutor.148 
On appeal, Harris argued that the preclusion order violated his 
constitutional right to present a defense.149 The court of appeals noted 
that in 1995, the supreme court amended Criminal Rule 16 to expressly 
include preclusion clauses in both the government and defense expert 
disclosure rules.150 The court of appeals held that preclusion under Rule 
16(c)(4) was only permissible upon a judicial finding that (1) the 
defense’s violation of the duty of disclosure was “willful” and (2) lesser 
sanctions (such as a continuance) are inadequate to cure the prejudice to 
the government and to ensure future discovery compliance.151 
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial judge’s preclusion order.152 The 
Harris court also sustained Rule 16(c)(4)’s preclusion clause in the face of 
a direct constitutional attack.153 
A related defense expert disclosure issue develops when the 
defense does not give notice to the prosecution of its intent to interject 
expert themes into the case. For instance, what if the defense plans to 
argue “absence of scientific evidence” as a theme at trial? In other 
words, what if the defense plans to argue that sophisticated scientific 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 169–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
 147. Id. at 169–71. 
 148. Id. at 170–71. 
 149. Id. at 180–81. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 178–79. 
 152. Id. at 180 (“[W]hen a trial judge is confronted with willful disobedience 
to discovery rules and orders, the judge is not required to keep delaying the trial 
to protect the offending party's interest in a full hearing of the evidence. Rather, 
the judge has the discretion to order the trial to go forward with abridged 
evidence.”). 
 153. Id. at 181; see also Earl v. State, No. A-7385, 2002 WL 531097, at *4–5 
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2002) (affirming trial judge’s order precluding out-of-
state defense forensic testing of murder weapon by defense expert, where 
defense expert report would not be received until a few days before trial; 
defense had more than seven months to prepare case and no good reason why 
forensic testing could not have been pursued more timely). 
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testing was available to the police, but the police neglected to use it? 
Often, the defense will pursue this theme without providing notice that 
it intends to call an expert to explain why the scientific evidence would 
have been relevant. The problem is then compounded if the government 
gives mid-trial notice of a rebuttal expert. 
French v. State154 is illustrative. There, the defendant was tried for a 
gunshot assault.155 In her opening statement, the defense lawyer accused 
the police of a shoddy investigation and claimed that the police never 
performed gunshot residue tests on her client’s hands.156 She argued that 
these tests could have shown that her client was not the shooter.157 In 
response, the prosecutor stated that she intended to call a State Crime 
Lab expert to testify that these sorts of gunshot residue tests were 
unreliable and were not typically used by Alaska law enforcement.158  
The defense objected because the prosecution had given no notice of 
intent to call the expert before trial.159 
In his majority opinion, Judge Mannheimer held that the 
prosecution had no reason to know that it would need expert gunshot 
residue testimony or that it would be relevant, until the defense offered 
its theory of an inadequate investigation.160 Therefore, the trial judge 
was within his discretion to relax the usual expert witness disclosure 
deadline set by Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(B).161 
The French holding makes sense. “Absence of forensic evidence” 
can be a powerful defense theme.162 However, an attorney may not rely 
upon popular conceptions (or misconceptions) of how probative the 
questioned scientific evidence might be. Instead, the lawyer should 
properly file notice of the expert and then call the expert to explain the 
scientific principles in play to the jury. So, for instance, in the French 
case, the defense lawyer should have filed notice of an independent 
 
 154. No. A-7861, 2002 WL 54619 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2002). 
 155. Id. at *1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at *2. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at *2 n.1 (holding that Rule 16(b)(1)(i), as applied to lay witnesses, 
does not require the government to disclose before trial “the names of rebuttal 
witnesses whose knowledge was not thought to be germane to the case until a 
position taken by the defense during trial made it so”). 
 162. This conclusion is especially true given the continued debate 
surrounding the so-called “CSI effect,” whereby the popular crime sleuth drama 
series seems to have artificially elevated jurors’ expectations regarding the 
swiftness, certainty, and availability of forensic testing. See Tom R. Tyler, 
Review, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in 
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L. J. 1050, 1083–84 (2006). 
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expert to testify that gunshot residue tests were available and could 
have detected gunpowder residue (or its absence) on a suspect’s hands. 
The defense attorney could then have called the investigating officer and 
elicited testimony that the forensic testing could have been done, but 
was not. Had French’s defense attorney adopted this tactic, she would 
have then been entitled to argue a powerful “sloppy investigation” 
theme to the jury. But French’s lawyer did not do that. She simply 
waited until her opening statement and sprang the forensic expert issue 
upon the prosecution. Therefore, the French court correctly ruled that the 
government should be fairly permitted to call an expert to explain that 
such tests were, in actuality, of very little value.163 
C. Notice of Defenses 
Criminal Rule 16(c)(5) requires the defense to inform the 
prosecution of the general nature of the defense no later than ten days 
before trial.164 The rule requires notice of “the defendant’s intention” to 
rely on alibi, justification (self-defense), duress, entrapment, or any other 
statutory or affirmative defense.165 The rule states that defense notice of 
mental disease or defect or diminished capacity defenses is governed by 
statute.166 The defense’s failure to comply authorizes the court to grant 
the prosecution a continuance, or, if a continuance is inadequate, to 
“impose other sanctions” or preclude the defense.167 
The pre-1995 version of this rule only required notice of an insanity 
defense.168 However, in 1974, a trial court order requiring disclosure of 
intent to assert an alibi defense (a precursor to the present rule) survived 
a direct constitutional attack in Scott v. State.169 In Scott, the supreme 
 
 163. See also Hunter v. State, No. A-8868, 2007 WL 2405208, at *14–15 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2007) (finding no discovery violation where prosecution gave 
mid-trial notice of intent to call a police vice detective to explain the prevailing 
street price for commercial sex because the state was not placed on notice that 
testimony about street prostitution prices would be relevant until the sexual 
assault defendant ran a “commercial sex” defense at trial) (citing Howe v. State, 
589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979)). 
 164. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. Notice of diminished capacity and insanity defenses must be 
provided “within ten days of arraignment” absent a finding of good cause. 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.010(b), 12.47.020(a) (2008). 
 167. May a judge preclude defense witnesses from testifying to an alibi if the 
judge finds a willful failure to provide pretrial notice? In a pre-1995 case, the 
court of appeals faced this issue, characterized it as “close,” and dodged it.  
Sellers v. State, No A-1454, 1988 WL 1511370, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 24, 
1988) (declining to decide this issue). 
 168. See Williams, supra note 137, at 49 n.109. 
 169. 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974). 
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court held that the general nature of a defendant’s trial defense was not 
privileged because it was analogous to a pre-trial plea.170 
However, the Scott court also held that a broader pre-trial order, 
which compelled disclosure of places the defendant claimed to have 
been, violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.171 In 1997, 
the supreme court reaffirmed Scott and found the legislature’s initiative 
to mandate reciprocal discovery in criminal cases a violation of the state 
constitution.172 
What if the defense seeks to tactically thwart the purpose of Rule 
16(c)(5)’s disclosure requirement and files an intentionally over-
inclusive notice? For instance, what if a defense lawyer in a murder case 
opts to “play it safe” and file pre-trial notice of self-defense and alibi? 
One of those two defenses might be true, but they both are obviously 
not. What if a defense attorney goes a step further and files a notice 
which boldly asserts that the defendant “may intend” to assert one of a 
dozen affirmative defenses and every single justification theory 
recognized in Title 11? How could a prosecutor contend with such an 
over-designation tactic? 
The best answer combines a professional responsibility component 
with a tactical threat. The Alaska Code of Professional Conduct states 
that lawyers may not knowingly violate the rules of a tribunal and must 
make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with the opponent’s proper 
discovery requests.173 Nor may an attorney make a false legal or factual 
statement.174 The prospect of professional discipline should be 
reinforced with a very real threat that a disingenuous pleading itself 
may be admissible as a jury exhibit.   
“[W]hen an attorney makes a formal statement in a brief or an in-
court stipulation, that statement constitutes an admission.”175 Such 
evidence would not violate the defendant’s right against self-
incrimination.176 The drafters of Criminal Rule 16(c)(5) clearly 
 
 170. Id.; see also Case v. Municipality of Anchorage, 128 P.3d 193, 195–96 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2006) (affirming the trial court’s finding in a speeding ticket 
case that there was no apparent infringement upon the privilege against self-
incrimination, as the “‘meritorious defense’ rule merely requires defendants to 
give advance notice of their general theory of defense”). 
 171. Scott, 519 P.2d at 787. 
 172. State v. Summerville, 948 P.2d 469, 469–70 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam). 
 173. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.4(c)–(d); Supreme Court Order 1690, 
effective Apr. 15, 2009. 
 174. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.3(a)(1). 
 175. David v. State, 123 P.3d 1099, 1102 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); see also 
Brigman v. State, 64 P.3d 152, 166–67 & n.28 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (collecting 
cases). 
 176. Scott, 519 P.2d at 787 (Alaska 1974) (holding that court ordered disclosure 
of intent to assert alibi did not violate right against self-incrimination). 
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contemplated the admissibility of the defense notice, because an early 
draft of this proposed rule provided that the notice would not be 
admissible against the defendant if withdrawn at least ten days prior to 
trial.177 The current version of Criminal Rule 16(c)(5) does not expressly 
address withdrawal or admissibility of the notice as a trial exhibit. 
Nevertheless, a prosecutor faced with over-designation may legitimately 
counter with a David-Brigman178-based motion to admit the document as 
a jury exhibit. 
Trial practitioners should note that mere compliance with the 
notice provision of this rule does not automatically entitle the defendant 
to a jury instruction on the asserted defense. The defendant must still 
offer trial evidence to meet his burden of pleading and proof. If the 
defendant fails to meet that burden, the trial judge may deny a jury 
instruction on the asserted defense.179 
D. Physical Evidence 
Criminal Rule 16(c)(6) requires defense counsel to “immediately” 
notify the prosecutor of defense acquisition of physical evidence.180 It 
requires surrender within a “reasonable” time and prohibits defense 
testing or alteration of the physical item without prior notification to the 
prosecution and the reasonable opportunity for court action.181 The 
defense must reveal all information regarding the manner in which the 
items were obtained and handled, “unless that information is 
privileged.”182 Finally, the rule provides that if the evidence is ultimately 
presented to a jury, the jury may not be informed that the evidence was 
obtained from the defense.183 
 
 177. Letter from criminal rules committee member Judge Charles R. Pengilly 
to Assistant Public Defender Randall Patterson, September 12, 1994, page 2 
(containing text of proposed Rule 16(c)(5): “Evidence of the notice provided 
pursuant to this provision is not admissible against the defendant if withdrawn 
at least ten days prior to trial.”) (copy on file with author). 
 178. See David, 123 P.3d 1099; Brigman, 64 P.3d 152. 
 179. Marshall v. State, 198 P.3d 567, 573 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (“. . . the fact 
that a defendant has given pretrial notice of that defense under Rule 16(c)(5) 
does not exempt him from the rule that, if there is no evidence offered to 
support each element of the proposed defense, a trial judge need not instruct the 
jury on that defense”). 
 180. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(6). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
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This rule, enacted in 1995 and substantially revised in 2001,184 
codified the holding of Morrell v. State,185 which held that a defense 
attorney has no privilege to obtain physical evidence and then withhold 
the physical evidence from the government.186 
With this rule, the supreme court provided an answer to a 
recurring defense dilemma: what happens when a defense lawyer 
becomes aware of the location of important physical evidence? What if 
the source of the defense lawyer’s knowledge is a confidential attorney-
client communication? 
Alaska law is now quite clear. Upon detection of physical evidence, 
the defense lawyer may do one of two things. First, the lawyer may 
leave the item in the field and refrain from seizing, altering, or moving 
it. The lawyer could then validly claim that any attorney-client 
communication that revealed the location of the item is privileged and 
rely upon familiar confidential attorney-client communication principles 
to resist the item’s compelled disclosure.187 On the other hand, if the 
attorney (or her investigator) physically seizes the item, the act of seizure 
operates as a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the time, 
circumstances, manner, and subsequent handling of the item.188 
This rule makes sense because, by seizing the item, the attorney 
deprives the police of the opportunity to discover and observe the item 
in its original location. The defense attorney who intentionally 
withholds the seized item from police runs the risk of being found in 
violation of a rule against evidence tampering or hindering 
prosecution.189 Therefore, this rule prevents the defense lawyer and her 
investigator from engaging in a “race” against the police to seize and 
conceal physical evidence. 
 
 184. Amending Criminal Rule 16(c)(6) Concerning Disclosure of Physical 
Evidence by the Defense, Supreme Court Order 1444, effective Oct. 15, 2001; 
Supreme Court Order 1191, supra note 137. 
 185. 575 P.2d 1200, 1210–11 (Alaska 1978); see also McCormick v. Municipality 
of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a motorist’s 
blood drawn by and held by attorney following DWI arrest was subject to 
prosecution’s search warrant and was not privileged); State v. Clark, No. A-2866, 
1989 WL 1594926, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1989). 
 186. Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1210. 
 187. See ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b). 
 188. See Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1985); People v. 
Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1981). 
 189. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.56.610(a), 770(a) (2006). 
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IV.  REGULATION OF DISCOVERY: CRIMINAL RULES 16(d) AND 17 
This part will deal with provisions of Rules 16 and 17 that govern 
both parties’ conduct. In particular, this part will discuss what actions 
neither side may take, as well as the general discretionary power of the 
trial court to restrict discovery and also the use of the subpoena power 
to obtain evidence. 
A. Neither Side May Instruct Witnesses Not to Speak to the 
Opposing Party 
In State v. Murtagh, 190 the supreme court stated that Rule 16(d)(1) of 
the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure “prohibits both the prosecution 
and the defense from advising witnesses ‘to refrain from discussing the 
case with opposing counsel’ and likewise prohibits ‘otherwise 
imped[ing] opposing counsel’s investigation of the case.’”191 
The Murtagh court approvingly quoted the 1993 ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice, which states that, if asked by a witness, it is not 
improper for a criminal practitioner to inform witnesses that interviews 
with opposing counsel are not legally required.192 Counsel may tell the 
witness that the witness may contact one attorney prior to speaking with 
the other attorney.193 An attorney may inform the witness that it is 
proper to request an opportunity for both attorneys to be present at the 
interview—as long as the lawyer does not use this tactic as a means to 
block opposing counsel’s investigation.194 The supreme court also noted 
that it is proper to caution witnesses regarding signing a statement 
prepared by another person.195 The Murtagh court noted that the ABA 
Standards place similar restrictions on the defense.196 Similarly, the court 
of appeals has stated that it is ethically improper for a prosecutor to 
influence a witness to claim a privilege.197 
B. Neither Party May Ignore Its Continuing Discovery Obligation 
Both parties’ discovery obligations are continuing ones.198 If new, 
discoverable information is identified, opposing counsel must be 
 
 190. 169 P.3d 602 (Alaska 2007). 
 191. Id. at 610 (quoting ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1)) (alteration in original). 
 192. Id. at 610–11. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 610. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 610 n.39. 
 197. Spencer v. State, 642 P.2d 1371, 1376 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 198. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2). 
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“promptly” notified.199 If the new information is discovered “during 
trial,” the party must also notify the court.200 
A common application of this rule occurs when the prosecution 
decides to call rebuttal witnesses to contradict facts presented by the 
defense’s case-in-chief. If the prosecution has not previously provided 
the rebuttal witnesses’ record of criminal convictions, it is required to do 
so as soon as the prosecutor’s intent to call the rebuttal witness is 
formed, which is probably in the midst of the defense’s case-in-chief. 
Failure to do so constitutes a violation of this rule.201 
C. Neither Party May Freely Disclose Certain Discovery 
 Information to Third Parties 
Rule 16(d)(3) states that discovery must be kept in the exclusive 
custody of counsel if the information is: 
(i) a criminal history record of a victim or witness; 
(ii) a medical, psychiatric, psychological, or counseling record 
of a victim or witness; 
(iii) an adoption record; 
(iv) a record that is confidential under AS 47.12.300 [juvenile 
records] or a similar law in another jurisdiction; 
(v) a report of a presentence investigation of a victim or 
witness prepared pursuant to Criminal Rule 32 or a similar 
law in another jurisdiction; 
(vi) a record of the Department of Corrections other than an 
incident report relating to the crime with which the 
defendant is charged; or 
(vii) any other record that the court orders be kept in the 
exclusive custody of the attorney.202 
Note that if either party wishes to prevent disclosure, the 
appropriate remedy is an application for a restriction order under Rule 
16(d)(3)(A)(vii).203 
The rule places limitations on how much information the defense 
lawyer may disclose directly to the defendant.204 The rule also places 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Herrera v. State, No. A-6171, 1997 WL 367214, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. June 
4, 1997) (holding that it was error for the Government not to produce conviction 
records of its rebuttal witnesses). 
 202. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(3)(A). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(3)(B)–(C). 
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restrictions on a pro se defendant’s access to a witness’s conviction 
record.205 
D. The Court Retains Broad Discretion to Limit or Defer Discovery 
Probably the most overlooked facet of Rule 16 is the provision that 
expressly permits either party to make applications for restriction of 
discovery ex parte and in camera.206 Rule 16(d)(4) provides the trial 
judge with broad discretion, upon a showing of good cause, to order 
that discovery be “restricted or deferred” so long as the party that is 
entitled to the discovery receives it in time to permit “beneficial use 
thereof.”207 Rule 16(d)(6) expressly permits the application to be brought 
ex parte, without service upon opposing counsel, and in camera, 
undisclosed on the public record.208 
As we have seen, Alaska criminal discovery is primarily a one-way 
street.209 For this reason, it will be the prosecutor who most frequently 
invokes the rules that allow an ex parte application for deferral and 
restriction of otherwise mandatory discovery. And what a useful tool 
the rule provides. Considered together, Rules 16(d)(4) and (d)(6) place a 
powerful tool in the hands of the creative prosecutor-investigator team. 
Consider this example: A homicide investigator informs the 
prosecutor that a jailhouse informant has contacted the police and 
disclosed that an in-custody, represented, pre-trial homicide defendant 
has made significant jailhouse admissions regarding the charged 
homicide.210 The informant also claims that the suspect has made 
significant admissions regarding a second, uncharged violent crime. 
 
 205. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(3)(D) (stating that when criminal history 
records of witnesses are provided to a pro se defendant, the court shall order 
that the defendant restrict the custody and use of the records and advise the pro 
se defendant that a violation of the order is punishable as contempt); see also 
Rodes v. City of Kenai, No. A-5536, 1996 WL 33686482, at *4–5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Feb. 21, 1996). 
 206. See ALASKA. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(6). 
 207. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(4). 
 208. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(6). 
 209. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974) (expressly pointing out 
that ascertainment of facts in criminal proceedings is “a one-way street” in 
which the defendant has the right to stand silent while the prosecutor attempts 
to meet his burden of proof) (quoting Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 
372 P.2d 919, 924 (Cal. 1962)). 
 210. This example is drawn from the author’s practice. Several years ago, the 
author filed such an ex parte, in camera motion to defer discovery in a jailhouse 
homicide informant case. The judge granted the motion. See State v. Garrison, 
3AN-S01-5461 Cr. (original documents on file with the author). Garrison has 
now been sentenced for two homicides. The cases are closed and the documents 
relating to this deferral motion are unsealed and open to public inspection. 
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Whether true or not, the informant’s report is clearly discoverable 
by the target’s defense counsel pursuant to Rule 16(b)(1)(ii).211 However, 
the chief investigator tells the prosecutor that the investigative team 
needs time. Given several weeks of delay, the investigative team might 
be able to corroborate the admissions and further solidify the proof as to 
the charged homicide, and may be able to solve the uncharged case. 
The prosecutor has a dilemma. The discovery rule requires 
disclosure, but delayed discovery is clearly in the interest of law 
enforcement and public safety. If the statements were immediately 
disclosed to the defense, the defendant might contact collaborators, 
destroy physical evidence, and silence third-party witnesses. The police 
officers’ opportunity to interview other witnesses may evaporate, and 
the physical safety of the jailhouse informant may be jeopardized. 
Rules 16(d)(4) and (d)(6) offer a realistic solution. The prosecutor 
should make an ex parte and in camera request for an order delaying 
discovery of the defendant’s oral admissions. The prosecutor’s motion 
should be filed under seal and supported by the investigator’s affidavit 
which explains the suspect’s admissions; the investigator’s interest in 
pursuing the new leads; and the possible danger to the informant, to the 
investigation, and to third parties should the motion be denied. The 
prosecutor should ask for an order deferring discovery of the motion 
until a certain date (for instance, a specific date several weeks distant) or 
thirty days before trial, whichever occurs first. Finally, the prosecutor 
should ask that the motion remain sealed and retained in chambers until 
that date to avoid inadvertent dissemination within the court system. 
Such a procedure would allow the investigators precious time to track 
down new leads and to arrange for the informant’s movement to 
another custody facility.212 
Prosecutors could conceivably employ an ex parte, in camera 
request to defer discovery in other contexts. A prosecutor could request 
ex parte, in camera review of a crime victim’s otherwise confidential 
psychological counseling,213 medical,214 or pre-sentence report records.215 
 
 211. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(ii) (mandatory disclosure of the accused’s 
statements, whether recorded or not); Marshall v. State, 198 P.3d 567, 574 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (state’s failure to disclose statements attributable to 
defendant gleaned from an interview with a cooperating informant constituted a 
discovery violation). 
 212. Such an order would be consistent with one stated objective of Criminal 
Rule 16, albeit a seldom-cited one: the rule’s deferential goal of “effective law 
enforcement.” ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a). 
 213. See Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *4 
(Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (approving trial judge’s conclusion that there 
was no good faith basis that an in camera review of counseling records would 
lead to disclosure of favorable evidence); see also Fox v. State, 685 P.2d 1267, 1273 
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Similarly, well-settled Alaska case law permits ex parte, in camera 
review of questioned police officer personnel records.216 
E. Subpoena Power 
Criminal Rule 17(c) allows either party to subpoena documents to 
court (subpoena duces tecum) from the records’ custodian.217 Upon 
application, meaning motion and order, the court may allow the parties’ 
inspection of the materials prior to trial.218 However, practitioners 
should note that litigants may not subpoena documents to their offices, as 
this is an abuse of process.219 
V.  PRACTICE ISSUES 
This Part will deal with issues that typically arise during criminal 
trials and investigations. It is organized in three sections. First, discovery 
issues regarding juror information will be discussed. Second, the law 
concerning the timing of discovery disclosures will be reviewed. Third, 
 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (affirming the trial court’s decision not to allow the 
defense to review the juvenile record of victim of alleged sexual assault after an 
in camera inspection); Spencer v. State, 642 P.2d 1371, 1375–76 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1982) (agreeing with the trial court’s decision not to release the mental records of 
defendant’s estranged wife, a primary prosecution witness, after an in camera 
inspection). 
 214. See Page v. State, Nos. A-3551, A-5754, 1997 WL 45119, at *5–6 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1997) (upholding the trial court’s decision to not disclose the 
victim’s medical records after an in camera inspection). 
 215. See Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) 
(denying disclosure of a victim’s pre-sentence report records after an in camera 
inspection). 
 216. See March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 717–18 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). The fact 
that these ex parte procedures are established in Alaska procedural and 
decisional law is important because Alaska’s Code of Judicial Conduct includes 
a presumptive ban on all ex parte litigant-judicial contacts, with certain limited 
exceptions, including when “expressly authorized by law.” See ALASKA CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(7)(a). 
 217. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 17(c). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Wyatt v. State, No. A-3607, 1997 WL 250441, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. 
May 14, 1997) (approving in dicta that the trial judge properly imposed 
sanctions upon a prosecutor who used an ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 17(c) subpoena to 
compel delivery of bank records to his office rather than to the court), aff’d, 
Wyatt v. State, 981 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1999); see also Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 
800 (Alaska 1974) (criticizing district attorney who subpoenaed witnesses to his 
office rather than to court); Page, 1997 WL 45119, at *6–7 (implying that ALASKA 
R. CRIM. P. 17(c) contemplates document production by the custodian to the 
court, not directly to the attorney). 
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this section will examine what information a prosecutor is not required 
to disclose. 
A. Juror Information 
In Tagala v. State,220 the court of appeals stated: 
We believe that the prosecutor should disclose to the defense, 
upon request, criminal records of jurors, at least in cases where 
the prosecution intends to rely on them. If the state is entitled 
to examine criminal records of jurors for jury selection, it is fair 
for the defense to have access to the same information.221 
However, if the prosecutor’s office compiles more than a juror’s 
“criminal records,” such as background information or prior results in 
cases where that person served as a juror, the information is probably 
protected under Criminal Rule 16(b)(8) as work product.222 
B. Timing of Disclosure 
With few exceptions,223 Criminal Rule 16 does not establish an 
express discovery timeline.224 Rule 3.8(d) of the Alaska Rules of 
 
 220. 812 P.2d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). 
 221. Id. at 613. 
 222. Ingles v. State, Nos. A-6157, A-3731, 1997 WL 796504, at *1–2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Dec. 24, 1997) (holding that in-house Fairbanks District Attorney’s juror 
background records were not discoverable); Hiser v. State, No. A-4980, 1994 WL 
16196673, at *1 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (concluding that the trial 
judge properly denied request for juror police contact records and results of 
prior interviews on voir dire because, if such material existed, it was protected 
as government work product). 
 223. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B) (requiring government expert 
disclosure “as soon as known and no later than forty-five days before trial”); 
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(4) (requiring defense expert disclosure thirty days 
before trial); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(5) (requiring notice of statutory and special 
defenses ten days before trial). 
 224. Some Alaska trial courts have attempted to impose “standing orders” 
which purport to establish rigid discovery timelines, but such “local orders” are 
of questioned validity. In Alaska, rulemaking authority is reserved to the Alaska 
Supreme Court, not the lower trial courts. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15. 
Rulemaking is governed by administrative rule. ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 44(a), 
46(b) (providing for statewide court system uniformity in rulemaking and 
vesting all rulemaking power in the supreme court). Of course, the nuanced 
constitutional argument regarding the validity of a local discovery rule would 
be of little utility to a prosecutor faced with a skeptical trial judge’s pointed 
inquiry about why police reports and taped statements had not been disclosed 
to the defender within a certain number of days of arraignment, e.g., “as is the 
long standing order in my courtroom.” The wise prosecutor would best leave the 
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Professional Conduct merely says that the prosecutor must provide 
“timely” discovery.225 The professional conduct rule does not define 
“timely.” 
In In Re Attorney C,226 the Colorado Supreme Court was recently 
required to construe an identically-worded ethical rule. There, the 
prosecutor did not disclose “witness recant statements” until after a 
preliminary hearing.227 The Colorado court held that the prosecutor’s 
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence meant that disclosure should 
be accomplished prior to the next “critical stage” of the case.228 
In 2007, a disciplinary hearing committee of the North Carolina Bar 
relied on this case when imposing disbarment upon Michael Nifong, 
prosecutor for the botched Duke lacrosse team sexual assault case.229 In 
the wake of Attorney C and the Nifong disbarment hearing, no 
prosecutor should allow a preliminary hearing, a grand jury, or a 
motions deadline to pass with significant undisclosed discovery sitting 
on her desk. 
The timing of government disclosure is a frequently recurring 
issue. Due to a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial,230 criminal 
cases proceed to trial far more quickly than civil lawsuits. Unlike civil 
practitioners, who have the luxury of deposing all important witnesses 
and compelling disclosure of most important facts months (or years) 
before jury trial, criminal practitioners are often thrust into trial with 
undiscovered facts lurking in the weeds. 
There is no discovery violation if the government discovers new 
information or the identity of an important witness on the eve of (or in 
the midst of) trial and then discloses this information immediately 
because the prosecution and defense learn of the information at 
approximately the same time.231 
 
effete constitutional bickering for another day and comply with the local 
practice. 
 225. ALASKA R. PROF. CONDUCT 3.8(d). 
 226. 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002). 
 227. Id. at 1168. 
 228. Id. at 1171–72. 
 229. See N.C. State Bar v. Nifong, 06 D.H.C. 35 (June 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.ncbar.com/Nifong%20Findings.pdf. 
 230. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45. 
 231. See Buie v. State, No. A-4706, 1995 WL 17220362, *10–12 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 1995) (finding no violation where prosecution immediatley disclosed 
identity of witness to defense); see also Butler v. State, No. A-9562, 2008 WL 
4890238, at *9 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2008) (“From time to time, new 
information will be revealed at a criminal trial that aids one side or the other, or 
that hurts one side or the other. To a certain extent, this is an expectable 
consequence of calling witnesses into court to testify under oath and to be 
subjected to cross-examination.”). 
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C. Is There Anything a Prosecutor May Refuse to Disclose? 
1.  The Defense Is Not Entitled to the Prosecution’s Witness List (and 
the Prosecutor Should Not Expect One From the Defense)  
The prosecution is not required to provide the defense a formal 
civil-litigation-like witness list. The defense is entitled to disclosure of 
the names and addresses, and disclosure of statements of witnesses and 
the accused.232 But Rule 16 does not require the prosecutor to commit, 
before trial, to a detailed “script” of witnesses who will actually be 
called at trial. 
In Savo v. State,233 the defendant argued that he was unfairly 
surprised by two prosecution witnesses because he never received 
formal notice that the prosecutor would call the witnesses at trial.234 The 
court of appeals rejected the argument and held that the rule merely 
required that the state provide Savo with “[t]he names and addresses of 
persons known by the government to have knowledge of relevant facts 
and their written or recorded statements or summaries of [their] 
statements.”235 The prosecution had done that.236 Thus, the rule requires 
disclosure of a broader group of persons than intended witnesses, but it 
does not require the state to specify who it actually intends to call.237 
In Howe v. State,238 the supreme court explained why a rule 
requiring a definitive prosecution commitment of the identity of precise 
trial witnesses was impractical.239 The supreme court noted that, often 
times, a prosecutor will not know until shortly before (or during) trial 
precisely whom he intends to call to the stand due to witness 
unpredictability and availability.240 The court noted that, in criminal 
cases, serious trial preparation often does not commence until “shortly 
before trial” due to the “mass of the more routine criminal cases.”241 
May a trial judge require the defense to disclose a “witness list” of 
potential (non-expert) defense witnesses? As a matter of federal 
constitutional law, the answer is clearly “yes.”242 But, the answer is 
completely different as a matter of Alaska constitutional law. In the 
 
 232. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1). 
 233. No. A-7884, 2002 WL 1467430 (Alaska Ct. App. July 10, 2002). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at *1 (quoting ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i)). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at *2; see also Bremond v. State, No. A-5019, 1994 WL 16196672, at *2 
(Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1994) (”Criminal Rule 16 (b)(1)(i) does not require the 
state to provide the defendant with a list of its trial witnesses”). 
 238. 589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979). 
 239. See id. at 424 n.7. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970). 
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wake of Scott v. State,243 one would think that the answer to this question 
in an Alaska state courtroom would be well-settled in the negative. 
However, in Elson v. State,244 the trial judge ordered the defense to 
disclose its witness list to facilitate meaningful voir dire.245 The judge 
coupled this order with another order barring the prosecution staff from 
contacting the witnesses whose names he compelled the defense lawyer 
to reveal in open court.246 The defense lawyer objected but ultimately 
disclosed the names of several potential witnesses.247 The court of 
appeals assumed, “without deciding,” that the trial judge’s order 
violated Scott but found the error harmless.248 
In a trial held nine years after Scott was decided, a trial judge in 
another small Alaska community did the same thing. In Smaker v. 
State,249 the trial judge not only required the defense attorney to 
announce the names of prospective witnesses, but when the defense 
lawyer sought to add another witness to the list in the midst of trial, the 
trial judge denied the request and precluded the witness’s testimony.250 
The court of appeals found an abuse of discretion and reversed the 
conviction.251 
In the wake of 1974’s Scott holding and 1997’s State v. 
Summerville,252 no Alaska prosecutor should expect an Alaska trial judge 
to compel a defense non-expert witness list. 
 
 243. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). The Scott court held that a pre-trial order 
requiring a criminal defendant to reveal the names and addresses of his 
potential witnesses violated article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution 
because it was compelled, testimonial, and incriminating. Id. at 786–87. 
 244. Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823 (Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993). 
 245. Id. at *5. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at *6. It is clear that the Elson trial judge’s order precluding the police 
from contacting any witness whose name was revealed by the defense 
compounded his error. The trial judge’s order essentially ordered an executive 
branch police agency to stop investigating a crime. The judge had no such 
authority. Such an order is clearly contrary to public safety policy goals and runs 
squarely afoul of separation of powers principles. See Public Defender Agency v. 
Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975) (“When an 
act is committed to executive discretion, the exercise of that discretion within 
constitutional bounds is not subject to the control or review of the courts.”). 
 249. 695 P.2d 238 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 250. Id. at 239–40 (“The Court: ‘You do have a duty to name the witnesses at 
jury selection. And I’ve always required that for nine years and I’ve told every 
counsel that they have a duty to do it and that’s why I told you to put the 
[]witnesses on the board.’”). 
 251. Id. at 241. 
 252. 948 P.2d 469, 469–70 (Alaska 1997) (per curiam) (“[T]he names of non-
alibi witnesses and their statements cannot be constitutionally compelled.”). 
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2. The Defense Is Not Entitled to Force the Prosecutor to Distinguish 
Between Case-in-Chief and Rebuttal Witnesses 
Criminal Rule 16 does not require the prosecutor to identify which 
potential witnesses may be called as rebuttal witnesses. The reason is 
obvious: the prosecutor will have no way to predict, at the beginning of 
trial, the content of the defense’s case-in-chief or if the defense will 
present a case at all. Therefore, the rule does not require the prosecution 
to blindly handcuff itself to an advance script of its rebuttal case before it 
knows what it will be called upon to rebut.253 Nor may a defendant 
demand that the prosecutor reveal its anticipated case-in-rebuttal plan 
before the defense rests.254 
 
3. The Defense Is Not Entitled to the Prosecutor’s Written List of 
Questions to Anticipated Witnesses 
In Thomas v. State,255 the prosecutor called a social worker to the 
stand in a child sexual abuse prosecution.256 The witness brought with 
her a list of questions which the prosecutor had given her.257 On the list, 
the witness had jotted her anticipated answers.258 The defense attorney 
asked to see the list, and cited Evidence Rule 612.259 The judge ordered 
disclosure of the witness’s answers but denied discovery of the 
questions.260 The trial judge ruled that disclosure of the list of questions 
was protected “work product.”261 
Perhaps surprisingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial judge 
on this basis, concluding that the witness had not used the document to 
 
 253. Charles v. State, No. A-8546, 2003 WL 23011811, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Dec. 24, 2003) (“[T]he discovery contemplated by [Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(A)(i)] 
is intended to take place at an early stage in the proceedings, and at that stage 
the prosecution often will have no clear idea who [among the persons having 
relevant knowledge] will be presented as witnesses at trial and who, among the 
witnesses, will be presented in the case in chief and who will be reserved for 
rebuttal.” (quoting Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1979)) (alteration in 
original)). 
 254. Elson v. State, Nos. A-2898, A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823, at *8 (Alaska Ct. 
App. July 28, 1993) (rejecting defense’s claim that the prosecution should have 
been required to reveal its intended case-in-rebuttal before deciding whether to 
rest the defense’s case-in-chief). 
 255. No. A-6015, 1997 WL 235504 (Alaska Ct. App. May 7, 1997). 
 256. Id. at *8. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Under Alaska Rule of Evidence 612(a), a defendant is entitled to examine 
“[a]ny writing . . . used by [the witness] to refresh [her] memory while 
testifying.” Rule 612(c) directs a trial judge to examine the document in camera, 
excise any privileged material from the document, then order disclosure of the 
rest. 
 260. Thomas, 1997 WL 235504, at *8. 
 261. Id. 
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refresh her recollection and that the list of questions was protected work 
product.262 This outcome is questionable. An attorney should not rely on 
work-product principles to protect a document freely given to a witness 
and then carried by the witness to the stand.263 However, the Thomas 
trial judge’s ruling disclosing the witness’s written answers was clearly 
correct. If the witness creates a written summary of anticipated answers, 
this “written statement” is clearly discoverable.264 
 
4. The Defense Is Not Entitled to Discovery of the Prosecution’s Chief 
Investigating Officer’s Notes Made During Trial in the Courtroom  
In Alaska criminal practice, the prosecutor is often permitted to 
have the investigative agency’s chief investigating officer sit at counsel 
table with her in order to assist in the presentation of evidence. 
Especially in a complex case, the chief detective’s assistance is often 
critical. Often, the chief investigating officer will also be a trial witness 
on the merits.265 
What if a sharp-eyed defense lawyer spots the detective passing 
written notes back and forth with the prosecutor? Wouldn’t such notes 
constitute a “written statement” of a witness and be subject to 
disclosure?266 The answer is no.  In Smith v. State,267 this very issue arose. 
The court of appeals concluded that the notes which passed between the 
investigating officer were protected work product and were based upon 
the same trial testimony the defendant and his lawyer had witnessed.268 
Therefore, they were not discoverable.269 
 
 
 262. Id. at *9. 
 263. Lowery v. State, 762 P.2d 457, 460 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (stating that 
work-product protection is waived by calling the witness to the stand as to 
matters covered by the testimony). 
 264. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i); cf. Smith v. State, No. A-6183, 1997 
WL 688646, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1997) (holding that the prosecutor’s 
failure to preserve and disclose a diagram drawn by a witness during a pre-trial 
interview was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily because the 
diagram was similar to an earlier diagram the witness had drawn for police). 
 265. Alaska’s evidence rules allow the trial judge to exempt the chief 
investigating officer from the witness exclusion rule. See ALASKA R. EVID. 615(3). 
 266. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(i). 
 267. No. A-6183, 1997 WL 688646 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1997). 
 268. Id. at *2. 
 269. Id. 
FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC 5/8/2009  2:30:56 PM 
88 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
 
5.  The Defense Is Not Entitled to the Prosecutor’s Pre-trial Interview 
Notes of Witness Interviews—as Long as the Witness Statements 
are Inculpatory, and the Substance Has Already Been Disclosed  
As explained above,270 if a prosecutor conducts an unrecorded 
interview of a trial witness before trial—provided that the witness is not 
a co-defendant—and learns of new, inculpatory facts, Alaska’s criminal 
discovery rule technically does not compel discovery of the new fact.271 
However, prosecutors must be cautious: this answer changes if the pre-
trial interview is recorded,272 reduced to writing,273 or discloses an 
exculpatory or mitigating fact.274 Finally, prosecutors who learn new, 
discoverable facts in the midst of trial are required to notify both the 
defense attorney and the court of the new development.275 
Notwithstanding Sivertsen v. State, given the court of appeals’ 
frequent suggestion that this quirk in Rule 16 is subject to prosecutorial 
manipulation,276 and given Rule 16’s stated objectives of minimizing 
trial delay and surprise,277 the cautious prosecutor should voluntarily 
document and disclose newly discovered facts. 
 
6. The Defense Is Not Entitled to Broad, “Anti-constitutionalist” 
Discovery 
Alaska has no shortage of rugged individualists who vigorously 
assert personal and political independence from government control. 
Periodically, Alaska criminal courts are confronted with pro se litigants 
 
 270. See supra Part II.A. 
 271. Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 1071–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), 
disapproved in part on other grounds, 981 P.2d 564 (Alaska 1999) (holding that 
Criminal Rule 16(b)(1) does not normally require a prosecutor to disclose oral 
statements made by a witness during a trial preparation interview); see also Nook 
v. State, No. A-7837, 2004 WL 1336268, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 2004) 
(holding that pre-trial interview statement was not discoverable under Brady, or 
Rule 16(b)(3) because it was not exculpatory at the time it was made). In a pre-
trial interview, witness claimed that defendant had kicked victim fifteen times 
causing death, but in a statement to police, witness claimed that defendant 
kicked victim twenty or twenty-five times. Id. 
 272. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i). 
 273. Id. 
 274. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3). 
 275. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2). 
 276. Sivertsen, 963 P.2d at 1072. (“We recognize that this interpretation of 
Criminal Rule 16(b)(1)(i) could be abused.”); see also Elson v. State, Nos. A-2898, 
A-4297, 1993 WL 13156823, at *12–14 (Alaska Ct. App. July 28, 1993) (recognizing 
that such a rule may encourage the prosecutor to abuse the system by simply 
refusing to make any recordings of interviews); Shaw v. State, No. A-3697, 1992 
WL 12153173, at *10 (Alaska Ct. App. May 6, 1992) (acknowledging the potential 
for abuse by not creating written or recorded evidence). 
 277. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(a). 
FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC 5/8/2009  2:30:56 PM 
2009 CRIMINAL DISCOVERY SURVEY 89 
who actively dispute the authority of Alaska’s state court system, state 
political subdivisions, and state legal institutions. Some of these litigants 
deny the constitutional authority of the state to adjudicate their criminal 
misconduct at all.278 
What if such “anti-constitutionalists” demand broad “discovery” 
aimed at disclosure of documents which they claim might undermine 
the authority of the government to bring the defendant before its courts? 
Such broad “anti-constitutionalist” discovery falls outside the ambit of 
Rule 16. For example, in Collier v. Municipality of Anchorage,279 the 
defendant sought information concerning the creation of the courts, the 
chartering of Anchorage, “the true name of his ‘government’ accuser, 
IRS documents, and police operating procedures.”280 This request was 
denied at trial and the decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, 
which held that Rule 16 did not require any such disclosures and, 
furthermore, that the information requested was not relevant because it 
had no bearing on the defendant’s guilt.281 
 
7. The Defense Is Not Entitled to Have the Prosecution Gather 
Information for It  
A fundamental premise underlying Rule 16 is that the government 
is required to disclose certain broad categories of existing information to 
a criminal defendant. However, Rule 16 does not compel the 
government to become the defense attorney’s investigative or litigation 
research staff. In other words, the government is not required to actively 
assist the defendant in the preparation of her case by creating 
documents that do not already exist. 
In State v. Clark,282 the trial judge precluded an informant from 
testifying at trial because, immediately on the eve of trial, he revealed 
 
 278. One is struck by the frequency with which litigants’ challenges to the 
authority of state legal institutions arise in cases from Palmer. See, e.g., Crane v. 
State, 118 P.3d 1084 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting challenge upon the 
authority of the Bar Association); Winterrowd v. State, No. A-9588, 2007 WL 
1378154, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. May 9, 2007) (challenging police officers’ 
authority). 
 279. 138 P.3d 719 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006) 
 280. Id. at 721. 
 281. Id. at 722; see also Gladden v. State, 153 P.3d 1028, 1033 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2007) (refusing pro se defendant’s request concering “lawyers” and “the bar 
association,” or documents proving that his prosecutor and trial judge were 
“public officers of the State of Alaska”); Winterrowd, 2007 WL 1378154, at *4 
(affirming decision refusing to compel prosecution to produce documents that 
would prove that police officers were “public officers with police powers”); 
Allen v. State, Nos. A-7183, A-4376, 2001 WL 357133, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Apr. 11, 2001) (affirming refusal to disclose correctional facility policies in a 
jailhouse assault on officer case). 
 282. 568 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1977). 
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that he had used an alias.283 The trial judge ruled that the prosecution 
had not used due diligence in discovering the informant’s true identity 
and ruled that he would be precluded from testifying at trial.284 The 
prosecution appealed, and the supreme court reversed.285 Justice 
Connor, writing for the court, explained that, “Nothing in Rule 16 
requires the prosecution to discover information which it does not 
possess or control, or to prepare the defendant’s case for him.”286 
Instead, the rule is limited to instances where the state actually 
possessed the requested information.287 
Prosecutors should be watchful for aggressive defense production 
requests and carefully identify those demanding production of 
documents which already exist and those demanding a government 
agency create a document that does not yet exist. Where the defense 
requests information that does not already exist, Clark precludes a trial 
judge from ordering its production.288 
This issue occasionally arises where a defense lawyer points to a 
police computer dispatch printout that discloses that half a dozen police 
officers arrived on-scene at a street crime investigation. As is often the 
case, only two or three officers may have submitted formal, written 
reports. The defense attorney demands an explanation. The prosecutor 
responds that each of the officers that conducted substantive 
investigations wrote and submitted reports and the others did not. 
Unsatisfied, and wary of undisclosed significant facts, the defense 
attorney demands an affirmative showing that the other officers wrote 
no report or an affirmative statement from the other officers that they 
did no substantive investigation. May a judge order the other police 
 
 283. Id. at 407–08. Of course, an alias is merely a specific false claim of 
identity. As Judge Coats explained, ”[n]either the cases nor Criminal Rule 16 
specifically requires the state to produce for the defendant evidence showing 
that a witness has been dishonest on particular occasions.” Burke v. State, No. A-
4683, 1993 WL 13156813, at *1 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1993). 
 284. Clark, 568 P.2d at 407–08. 
 285. Id. at 408. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id.; see also Rodes v. City Of Kenai, No. A-5536, 1996 WL 33686482, at *5 
n.6 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996) (“The city was not required to create and 
produce written or recorded statements that it did not possess or that did not 
exist.”). 
 288. See Westbrook v. State, No. A-8464, 2003 WL 22723488, at *3 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Nov. 19, 2003). Of course, where a document exists in the possession of a 
third party, but it has not been seized by police, the defendant may move for a 
subpoena under Rules 16(b)(5) and (7), and 17(c). See supra Part II.F. 
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officers to create reports describing what they did or did not do at the 
scene? No. Such an order would run squarely afoul of Clark.289 
 
8. Defense Fishing Expeditions  
What if the defense files a pre-trial motion requesting that the 
prosecution provide police reports regarding every single witness’s past 
law enforcement contacts?290 Prosecutors should oppose such “fishing 
expeditions,” and defenders should be prepared to counter and 
articulate why they have a good faith basis for the request.291 
Alaska law restricts a defendant’s ability to engage in a broad-
ranging “fishing expedition” for impeachment and cross-examination 
material—especially where that “fishing expedition” will trigger a 
prosecution request for in camera review of any questioned materials. 
In Johnson v. State,292 the defendant was prosecuted for contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor.293 Johnson engaged in “grooming” 
behavior with a 15-year-old boy and his 13-year-old sister and, on 
several occasions, had helped them run away from home.294 Johnson’s 
defense was that the children’s father was abusive and, before trial, he 
filed discovery motions aimed at discovering specific details of the 
father’s abusive behavior.295 The trial judge denied the motions, and the 
court of appeals affirmed because there was no evidence that Johnson 
was aware of the abuse at the time of his alleged crime.296 
 
 289. See also Charles v. State, No. A-8546, 2003 WL 23011811, at *2 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Dec. 24, 2003) (“[W]e have held that Criminal Rule 16(b) does not impose a 
duty on the prosecutor or police to create a written summary of a witness’s oral 
statements made shortly before trial.”) (citing Sivertsen v. State, 963 P.2d 1069, 
1071–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998), disapproved in part, but on other grounds, 981 P.2d 
564 (Alaska 1999)). 
 290. Cf. Coney v. State, 699 P.2d 899, 901 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (remanding 
to allow parties to argue the relevancy of victim’s arrest record where the victim 
was the prosecution’s most critical witness, and where the defense squarely 
pointed at the victim as the “real suspect.”). 
 291. “[T]he party seeking judicial [in camera] review must provide the court 
with some reason to justify a detailed review of the materials—some reason to 
suppose that the materials will contain pertinent information. . . . [A] party has 
no right to demand that the trial judge conduct an in camera examination of 
confidential records or other privileged materials based merely on the possibility 
that these records might contain something that could be used to impeach a 
witness’s general credibility or the witness’s testimony on collateral issues.” 
Risinger v. State, Nos. A-6374, A-3849, 1998 WL 411300, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. 
July 22, 1998). 
 292. No. A-6402, 1998 WL 191152 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1998). 
 293. Id. at *1. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
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Johnson is consistent with subsequent Alaska cases holding that a 
defendant’s discovery rights are broad but not limitless. To be entitled to 
disclosure of otherwise undiscoverable information, the defense must 
offer more than a generalized assertion that the information might lead 
to impeachment evidence.297 
However, prosecutors should exercise great care in the area of self-
defense and justification cases. At least one earlier unpublished opinion 
is seemingly at odds with Johnson. In Roseman v. State,298 a police officer 
was prosecuted for use of excessive force upon an arrestee.299 After 
conviction, he moved for a new trial, arguing that he was improperly 
denied discovery of a police report that showed the arrestee had fought 
with a police officer in the past.300 The trial judge denied the motion, but 
the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the prosecution’s 
suppression of the police report was not harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.301 
As an evidentiary issue, Roseman is of questioned validity now, 
because Roseman would be prohibited from introducing the arrestee’s 
prior specific violent act at trial unless Roseman was subjectively aware 
of that event when he used force against him.302 
But the prosecutor’s obligation to discover exculpatory information 
is independent of the information’s admissibility. Therefore, in a self-
defense (or justification) case, the prosecutor’s safest course is to 
discover a full, APSIN “arrest record” printout and invite a defense 
motion to compel disclosure of the full police report. If the prosecutor 
 
 297. See, e.g., Cockerham v. State, 933 P.2d 537, 543–44 (Alaska 1997) (stating a 
“defendant’s right to access information . . . is not absolute”); see also Linne v. 
State, 674 P.2d 1345, 1354 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (affirming the denial of a 
request for discovery of “all bank records of [the victim]” in a theft prosecution 
as too broad); Bourdon v. State, Nos. A-7689, A-7699, 2002 WL 31761482, at *3–4 
(Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2002) (affirming denial of discovery motion seeking 
medical, mental health, alcohol counseling, and anger management records 
which were unrelated to charged offenses); Katelnikoff v. State, Nos. A-6848, A-
4064, 1999 WL 396885, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. June 16, 1999) (affirming denial of a 
“shotgun” discovery motion supported by nothing more than the hope that 
Crisis Center documents might contain impeachment evidence); Cytanovich v. 
State, Nos. A-6287, A-3762, 1998 WL 80110, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25, 
1998) (affirming trial judge who denied motion to disclose police reports about 
the victim’s drug history and violent history; trial judge only required the 
prosecutor to disclose reports that she had reviewed). 
 298. No. A-659, 1985 WL 1078004 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1985). 
 299. Id. at *1. 
 300. Id. at *3–4. 
 301. Id. at *4–5. 
 302. Alaska law on this point was very confused before 1996. See James 
Fayette, “‘If You Knew Him Like I Did, You’d Have Shot Him, Too . . .” A Survey of 
Alaska’s Law of Self–Defense, 23 ALASKA L.R. 171, 213–14 (2006). 
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has subjectively reviewed prior reports, then those should be 
discovered.303 
Where the defense establishes that the information it seeks is more 
than Bourdon-Katelnikoff tangential or “impeachment” evidence, the 
court of appeals has articulated that the trial judge must review the 
information in camera.304 
 
9. Police Officer Personnel Records and Misconduct 
If the defense shows that it has a “good faith basis for asserting that 
materials in an officer’s personnel file may lead to the disclosure of 
favorable evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera review” 
of the personnel file and rule on disclosure.305 The defense’s entitlement 
to an in camera review may be waived if it is not made in a timely 
manner. A mid-trial request is untimely.306 The defense showing must 
be more than a speculative “fishing expedition.”307 
Prosecutors should be ever-wary of police officer misconduct 
issues. A comprehensive survey of this area of the law is beyond the 
scope of this article. However, prosecutors should be aware that the 
Brady-Giglio-Kyles line of cases may impose a duty of disclosure 
regarding verified incidents of police misconduct in the officer’s 
personnel files.308 A prosecutor should proceed very cautiously if she 
encounters any of the following categories of derogatory officer 
information: (1) a finding of misconduct, such as a disciplinary letter, 
that reflects on the officer-witness’s truthfulness; (2) a finding of 
misconduct that indicates that the officer-witness may be biased; (3) a 
credible allegation of misconduct, subject to pending investigation, that 
reflects on the truthfulness or possible bias of the officer-witness; and (4) 
 
 303. See Cytanovich v. State, Nos. A-6287, A-3762, 1998 WL 80110, at *4 
(Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1998). 
 304. See Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 305. March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 718 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (italics omitted). 
 306. Dana v. State, 623 P.2d 348, 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981). 
 307. Id.; see also Allen v. State, Nos. A-7283, A-4376, 2001 WL 357133, at *3–4 
(Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2001) (affirming refusal to disclose correctional facility 
policies in a jailhouse assault on officer case). 
 308. See United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365, 1374 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
the defendant was entitled to disclosure of information that arresting police 
officer was being investigated for fraud involving money used to pay 
informants, since allegations would have been valuable for impeachment 
purposes due to their unquestionably serious nature); Dreary v. Gloucester, 9 
F.3d 191 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a 10-year old disciplinary finding that an 
officer falsified overtime records was admissible); cf. United States v. Ortiz, 5 
F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a trial court was within its discretion in 
excluding a letter from an officer’s personnel file indicating that he falsely 
reported hours of court attendance). 
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a past criminal charge or pending criminal charge brought against the 
officer-witness. 
Often, the prosecutor’s safest and most defensible course is to 
submit the issue to the trial judge by in camera, ex parte motion.309 The 
prosecutor could seek the court’s order either directing or denying 
discovery of the questioned misconduct report. If the misconduct is 
ordered to be discovered, the prosecutor could seek a re-disclosure 
prohibition, forbidding the defense from disseminating the report 
beyond the trial defense team. The court could also direct that the 
defense refrain from eliciting the derogatory information at trial absent a 
prior application brought outside the jury’s presence. 
D. Procedural Consequences of Discovery Practice 
1. Pre-trial Motions to Compel Discovery Toll Rule 45 
Alaska law is well-settled that, where a defendant seeks the court’s 
order to compel the prosecution to provide requested discovery, the 
motion tolls Rule 45.310 
 
2. The Defense Remedy for a Perceived Discovery Violation Is a 
Continuance or a Mistrial—Rarely Suppression, Striking 
Testimony, or Preclusion 
When a discovery violation comes to light before trial, the 
defendant is entitled to a continuance to re-evaluate the defense case.311 
If there has been a discovery violation and new information comes to 
light after trial has already started,312 and the defense has been 
prejudiced, “the trial court should ordinarily grant a defendant’s request 
for a mistrial.”313 The defendant is rarely entitled to outright suppression 
or preclusion of the evidence. Many Alaska cases stand for this 
proposition.314 
 
 309. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(4), (6). 
 310. Snider v. State, 958 P.2d 1114, 1118–19 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998); Drake v. 
State, 899 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995). 
 311. Friedmann v. State, 172 P.3d 831, 833 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 312. Not every mid-trial emergence of new evidence is a discovery violation. 
If the police and the prosecution were unaware of a new fact, and that fact 
surfaces in the midst of trial, and the prosecution and the defense learn of the 
new fact at the same time, there is no discovery violation. See Buie v. State, No. 
A-4706, 1995 WL 17220362, at *9–10 (Alaska Ct. App. March 29, 1995). 
 313. Friedmann, 172 P.3d at 833. 
 314. See, e.g., Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 347–48 (Alaska 1991); Christie v. 
State, 580 P.2d 310, 312 n.2 (Alaska 1978) (stating that “dismissal is rarely an 
appropriate remedy for untimely compliance with discovery”); Des Jardins v. 
State, 551 P.2d 181, 187 (Alaska 1976) (stating that “[t]he proper procedure for a 
trial court faced with prosecution failure to disclose to the defense evidence that 
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What if the government fails to appraise the defense of the current 
address of a potential witness? What if the defense alleges that, had they 
been informed of the witness’s current address, they would have been 
able to interview the witness? Is the defense entitled to have the 
witness’s testimony stricken? No. 
The court of appeals explained that, to be entitled to any remedy, 
the defense must articulate prejudice, going beyond the mere inability to 
interview the witness. In Calix v. State,315 a critical witness in a sexual 
assault prosecution gave a statement to police and then moved to 
California before trial.316 The prosecution disclosed the witness’s police 
statement but failed to update discovery when the witness moved out of 
state.317 On appeal, Calix argued that the witness’s testimony should 
have been stricken because he was unable to interview the witness prior 
to trial.318 The court of appeals found this allegation insufficient to 
require the trial court to strike the witness’s testimony.319 
Where the defendant moves for a new trial and establishes that the 
prosecution wrongfully suppressed evidence of which it was aware, the 
analysis changes sharply. Where the prosecution violates its duty of 
disclosure regarding known evidence, the defendant is entitled to a new 
 
it is required to provide, until just before it plans to use such evidence, is to 
grant a continuance long enough to allow the defense attorney adequate time to 
prepare”); Riney v. State, 935 P.2d 828, 838 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
a violation of Criminal Rule 16(b) justified a mistrial, but not suppression of the 
evidence); Russell v. State, 934 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that the remedy for surprise evidence mid-trial is a continuance or mistrial, and 
not suppression of the evidence); Wortham v. State, 689 P.2d 1133, 1142 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1984) (finding that defendant waived right to relief for alleged 
discovery violation when he did not make a motion for the material or ask for 
continuance, absent prejudice to him or bad faith); Mujahid v. State, No. A-9573, 
2008 WL 4757152, at *3–4 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2008) (holding dismissal not 
warranted for discovery violation which was detected and remedied mid-trial); 
Yoder v. State, No. A-9882, 2008 WL 2853443, at *6 (Alaska Ct. App. July 23, 
2008) (“Yoder was not entitled to a continuance or a mistrial because he did not 
show any plausible way in which his defense could have been prejudiced by 
these discovery problems.”); French v. State, No. A-7861, 2002 WL 54619, at *3 
(Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2002) (disclosure of 911 tape on first day of trial); Lyon 
v. State, Nos. A-3654, A-6219, 1997 WL 563137, at *3 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 10, 
1997) (holding defendant was not entitled to suppression of disclosure of 
Intoximeter calibration on day of trial). 
 315. No. A-6854, 1999 WL 34002417 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1999). 
 316. Id. at *2–3. 
 317. Id. at *3. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
FAYETTE_FINAL.DOC 5/8/2009  2:30:56 PM 
96 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
trial unless the court is convinced that the failure to disclose the 
evidence was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.320 
CONCLUSION 
Alaska’s criminal discovery rules place powerful tools in the hands 
of the criminal defender. The rules compel timely government 
disclosure of a broad spectrum of information and serve the important 
public policy goal that Alaska state court defendants have a better 
chance at a fair trial in state court than in other jurisdictions. One seldom 
encounters a defender who doubts that an Alaska defendant is more 
advantageously situated (at least in terms of discovery rights) than 
defendants in other jurisdictions—such as those jurisdictions where 
neither custodial interrogations nor grand jury presentations are tape-
recorded and where discovery rights are not enshrined in directive 
criminal procedural rules. At least viewed from the defense perspective, 
there can be little doubt that the framers of Alaska’s criminal discovery 
procedure rules heeded Justice Brennan’s call that facts—not surprise 
and maneuver—should determine the outcome of criminal cases. 
Alaska’s rules certainly provide a restricted degree of discovery for 
the government. With very few exceptions, an Alaska prosecutor may 
not compel the defender to “tip her hand.” But, an able Alaska 
prosecutor is not completely helpless. Alaska’s rules do allow 
prosecutors to compel fundamental expert discovery, pre-trial notice of 
defenses, and disclosure of physical evidence and also expressly permit 
ex parte, in camera applications to restrict or delay discovery. As we 
have seen, many of these procedural devices are useful tools in sensitive 
cases. 
As long as criminal justice is administered in the context of an 
adversarial litigation system populated by aggressive and skilled 
lawyers, discovery disputes will persist. This Article will not change 
that. But this survey is offered to my criminal bar colleagues in the hope 
that it will assist all criminal practitioners and judges to cogently 
navigate the boundaries of each party’s discovery obligations. Lawyers 
will always disagree on the facts and outcome of specific cases, but they 
should at least be able agree on what the law requires and about how 
courts have decided similar issues in the past. 
 
 
 320. Roseman v. State, No. A-659, 1985 WL 1078004, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Dec. 26, 1985). 
